

JPRS-EER-92-086
8 JULY 1992



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

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19980112 035

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22161

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East Europe

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CONTENTS

8 July 1992

HUNGARY

Government Position on Media Oversight Discussed [UJ MAGYARORSZAG 27 May]	1
Western Interest in Hungarian Police Described [FIGYELO 11 Jun]	1

ROMANIA

Iliescu on Domestic, Earth Summit Issues [DIMINEATA 20-21 Jun]	3
Election Chances for Opposition Viewed [ROMANIA LIBERA 21 May]	3
Berceanu on Elections, FSN Leftist Orientation [CURIERUL NATIONAL 24 Jun]	4
Gherman on FDSN Electoral, Alliance Strategies [CURIERUL NATIONAL 16 Jun]	5
SRI Seen as Unfit To Open Securitate Files [ROMANIA LIBERA 9 Jun]	6
Interior Ministry Officer on Role of Police [DIMINEATA 21 May]	7
Problems, Goals of Gypsy Minority Detailed [TINERETUL LIBER 26 May]	8
Problems in Integrating Abandoned Children [ROMANIA LIBERA 26 May]	9
Rights of Foreign Investors Under Land Law [TINERETUL LIBER 22 May]	10
Economic Problems of Livestock Complexes [ADEVARUL 28 May]	11

CROATIA

'Nearsightedness' of West's Policy on Bosnia [NOVI VJESNIK 11 Jun]	13
Relations With Slovenia Seen Cooling [VECERNJI LIST 24 Jun]	13
Elections Allegedly Scheduled for 26 Jul [VECERNJI LIST 14 Jun]	14
Defense Ministry Denies Involvement in Bosnia [SLOBODNA DALMACIJA 23 Jun]	15
Croatia's Risks in Freeing Dubrovnik Area [NOVI VJESNIK 12 Jun]	15
Slovene Daily Attacked for Anti-Croatian Bias [NOVI VJESNIK 19 Jun]	16

SLOVENIA

President Criticizes Obstructionism in Parliament [DELO 16 Jun]	18
Slovene Radio-TV Director Jerovsek Resigns [DNEVNIK 20 Jun]	19

YUGOSLAVIA

Albanians Allegedly Discriminated Against [POLITIKA 24 Jun]	21
Albanian Leader Nevzat Halili Interviewed [ZERI 6 Jun]	21
Issue of Command of Bosnian-Croatian Alliance [POLITIKA 18 Jun]	23
Croatian Foreign Minister Denies Military Pact [POLITIKA 20 Jun]	25
Arms Produced in Bosnia 'Plundered' by Croatia [POLITIKA 5 Jun]	25
Macedonian Agricultural Organization, Food Supply [NOVA MAKEDONIJA 31 May]	25
Serbs See Army Pullout From Region as Betrayal [BORBA 17 Jun]	26
Trifunovic, Varazdin Corps Officers Acquitted [POLITIKA 18 Jun]	27
Authorities Seen as Undermining University Protest [BORBA 25 Jun]	28
Biographic Data on Presidential Adviser Stojanovic [POLITIKA 18 Jun]	28
Republic Experiences Increased Foreign Debt [BORBA 17 Jun]	29
Data on Losses of Yugoslav Air Transport [NIN 12 Jun]	29

Government Position on Media Oversight Discussed

92CH0674B Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG
in Hungarian 27 May 92 p 4

[Statement by Jozsef Kajdi, administrative state secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister, to an unnamed MTI reporter: "The Government's Media Oversight"]

[Text] *As part of the past few weeks' media debate, opposition representatives repeatedly criticized the government's endeavor to supervise radio and television. The subject was raised at yesterday's SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] press conference that was held in parliament, and, presumably, the Constitutional Court will soon begin debating a recently submitted proposal by SZDSZ National Assembly Representative Alajos Dornbach. As reported earlier, one of the objections raised by Representative Dornbach was that the government supervised radio and television on the basis of a government determination dating back to 1974, one that cannot be regarded as a legal provision due to the changes that have occurred in the meantime. Administrative State Secretary Jozsef Kajdi of the Office of the Prime Minister informed an MTI reporter about the government's position regarding the legality of media supervision.*

"This is a mistaken or inappropriate understanding of the legislative law, in my view. Indeed, government determinations promulgated after the effective date of the legislative law, i.e., after 1 January 1988, are valid only insofar as they provide for the functions of organs addressed by such determinations and cannot be regarded as legal provisions. Nevertheless, the closing provisions of the law state that 'this law has no bearing on the effect of legal provisions, determinations...brought prior to the effective date of this law.' It then follows that the provisions of Decree With the Force of Law No. 24 of 1974 apply insofar as the scope of this determination is concerned. According to these provisions, any government determination published in MAGYAR KOZLONY 'has mandatory effect throughout the country with respect to all natural and artificial persons.' Correspondingly, every such government determination must be regarded as a legal provision," Jozsef Kajdi said.

"According to Paragraph 61 Section 3 of the Constitution now in force, laws enacted by parliament must provide for the supervision of radio and television as well as for the appointment of leaders at radio and television, the licensing of commercial radio and television stations, and the prevention of evolving information dissemination monopolies. Such provisions must be adopted by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the National Assembly representatives present. The government has fulfilled its obligation to prepare a legal provision based on this constitutional provision; it has prepared and submitted to the National Assembly a legislative proposal concerning radio and television and parliamentary debate regarding this proposal is in progress. However, at present there is no law in force that would resolve these issues at the level prescribed by the Constitution, except for Law No. 57 of 1990 providing for the order of appointing the leaders of public service information media. Consequently, until such time that the media law takes effect, the legal provisions governing these issues

cannot be repealed. An exlex situation would arise otherwise, and the public service information media (Hungarian Radio, Hungarian Television) funded by the state budget would operate outside the legal system. This is one reason why the government was unable to and continues to be unable to repeal Government Determination No. 1074-MT of 18 September 1974, despite the demands of certain opposition representatives.

"I must also state that in regard to the affairs of the Hungarian Radio and the Hungarian Television, the government has, in every instance, observed the legal provisions in force by applying the provisions of the Constitution, the law governing the order of appointing leaders of public service information media, and the already-mentioned Determination of 1974. Observing and enforcing the observance of these provisions is not only the right of the government, but also its constitutional duty."

The state secretary also said that the 1974 determination has undergone substantial changes since its promulgation. The Nemeth government had already begun modernizing the provisions; after amending the Constitution as decided in the course of national roundtable negotiations, it repealed the determination and amended its obsolete provisions. Precisely because of the constitutional requirement to frame a law, the Antall government has not made substantive changes in the determination, but it was forced to repeal certain provisions of the determination that conflicted with the so-called appointments law.

Western Interest in Hungarian Police Described

92CH0667B Budapest FIGYELO in Hungarian
11 Jun 92 p 38

[Unattributed article: "The West, Too, Is Interested in the Development of the Hungarian Police"]

[Text] The National Association of Prosecutors [UOE] was established as a professional-social organization two years ago. Its members have always observed UOE's nonpolitical character; their purpose is to help resolve professional issues and problems. As part of this work the UOE is organizing a conference of professionals and an exhibit called Kriminalexpo. Although there were some who suggested that the police or the Interior Ministry act as the organizer, several arguments supported the idea that Kriminalexpo be organized under the auspices of the UOE. In part, prosecutors serve as central buffers between the police and judges in criminal proceedings, and problems stemming from the two different functions also affect prosecutors. In part, advertising agreements must be entered into in the course of organizing an exposition of this kind. Prosecutors can act as parties to such contracts without committing themselves to anyone in any respect because they do not participate in past, present, or future tender invitations announced e.g., by the Ministry of the Interior.

No professional conference and exhibit of this nature and scope has been organized in Central Europe before. Prospective lecturers and exhibitors from virtually all over the world announce themselves daily. German and American command centers capable of immediately pinpointing by

satellite the location of any patrol car will be shown, and the protective system used at the Seville World Exposition—significant from the standpoint of the 1996 World Expo in Hungary—will also be exhibited. Rather high-ranking personalities will act as the (chief) patrons and the (chief) sponsors of the function; in addition to President of the Republic Arpad Goncz, five ministers from within the cabinet alone have agreed to serve as sponsors, and one also finds names like Bull, Kreutler-Vilati, Instrumentation Technology Computer, IBM, DEC, Unisys, Ascom, Elin, and Ericsson among the sponsors.

This great interest is shown for good reason, of course. Criminals and illegal immigrants have already recognized the liaison role Hungary plays between the East and the West. For this reason it is in the interest of the West to support Hungary in prosecuting crime because problems not resolved in Hungary for financial and technical reasons must be faced by the West. It costs less for the West to enable Hungary to serve as a dense filter in regard to criminal activities, than for them to prosecute crime. From the standpoint of prosecuting crime in Hungary, this "historical" situation has presented itself at the appropriate time because government funds alone do not suffice to modernize the Hungarian police within the necessary time frame. As Andras Hegedus, the head of UEO said, his organization regards this as an opportunity to combine professional and business interests. This could also provide an opportunity for Hungary to act as a professional center for modernizing police forces in other Central and East European countries. This is very important at a time when Hungary is once again bound to perform the function of the farthest outpost, as it did during the Turkish era; the sole difference being that today Hungary would also receive funds to pursue the fight, in addition to religious faith.

In the first two days of the conference foreign and EC experts will analyze the challenges faced by the Hungarian police and will make recommendations relative to the performance of the tasks. These presentations will be followed by a Hungarian response, stating Hungary's position. The proceedings of the conference will also be published in book form.

On Saturday, the third day, the experts will discuss evidentiary proceedings and within that the limits of exercising authority in the prosecution of crime and the rights of citizens; the relationship between the two; and the related legal guarantees. Saturday will be a highlight of the event for yet another reason. Visitors will be able to watch a program including drug enforcement and commando performances; this is to be followed by public debate beginning at 1400. Questions and comments by individuals and journalists will be fielded by Supreme Prosecutor Kalman Gyorgyi, National Police Chief Sandor Pinter, National Security Office Technical Director Ferenc Hevesi-Toth, Customs Service Commander Mihaly Arnold, Mayor Gabor Demszky, and by Mrs. Katalin Szomor Molnar, who acts as the secretary of the Interministerial Committee on Narcotics.

Short-term improvements and changes in outlook, and long-term improvements in the presently adversarial relationship between citizens and the state administration, are also expected to materialize as a result of the UOE function. Such changes are indispensable from the standpoint of both the prosecution and the prevention of crime. The significance of crime prevention will be highlighted at the exhibit booths of the National Police Command and of the National Customs and Revenue Command. These organizations are well aware that crime prevention is at least as important as the prosecution of crime.

Iliescu on Domestic, Earth Summit Issues
AU2906082692

[Editorial Report] Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian on 20-21 June on pages 1 and 5 carries a 4,000-word introductory statement by President Ion Iliescu at a news conference in Bucharest on 19 June.

Ion Iliescu begins his statement by expressing satisfaction with the Romanian Parliament's decision to hold parliamentary and presidential elections on 27 September. Along this line he says: "While still in Rio, I was pleased to learn about the decision made by the parliament," to "hold elections simultaneously on 27 September. I view this as a positive signal following the meetings and consultations I conducted with the chiefs of parties and parliamentary groups, and I view it as a positive precondition for the constructive and favorable atmosphere that ought to characterize the coming period, that is the preelectoral period. I think that it proves the maturity of the political forces and Romanian society and their desire to ensure a decent and civilized election campaign. A confrontation of opinions, options, and political position, as well as the presentation of programs and alternatives is normal for any election campaign. However, these confrontations have to focus on the essence of problems with arguments, political commitments, projects," and "on the confrontation of the qualities of the candidates who are running for these elections."

"The electorate has to be persuaded with solutions" aimed at "taking the economy and the Romanian society out of this crisis, as well as with credible alternative projects for the country's socioeconomic development, for strengthening the democratization process, building a state of law, promoting viable and effective strategies for the whole transition period, and ensuring the future development of the Romanian economy. This has to be a concern of all of us" as has the concern for "avoiding the use of violent language, physical violence, intimidation, and blackmail. The election campaign ought to be a genuine test of maturity for us. I think that the press has to play an important role during this period to ensure a constructive atmosphere of mutual esteem and regard, despite the differences of opinion, which are natural in a democratic society."

After briefly commenting on the aims of the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, which he had attended, President Ion Iliescu enumerates all the conventions signed and documents adopted during that conference. He then renders a brief, factual description of the contents of each of them. He ends by saying: "Finally, a few somewhat critical comments and views, and disappointing elements, because this conference did not end with tangible decisions and measures. Certainly, he who expects this of such a conference may be disappointed, but usually such international conferences are not decisionmaking bodies. Their importance lies in the way in which they approach problems, the prospects they open up, and in the consensus that is reached at the international—and in our case the planetary—level; and from this point of view, it seems to me that this conference marks a very important stage." He continues by emphasizing that "the material presented at this conference was the subject and result of extensive cooperation by specialists and

experts in all areas in an attempt to point out, on the one hand, problems and means to work out joint actions, and to promote the idea that the present-day world is a single whole, that we are all passengers on the same ship, the Earth, with a single destiny, that national interests are interdependent and intermingled with the common and only resources of this planet, and that it is the duty of all of us to ensure effective cooperation in rationally managing and administering these resources, while protecting the environment as a precondition for protecting life on our planet. Consequently, the philosophic undercurrent of this conference is the essential achievement of this conference which lays the foundation for both economic and political measures."

In conclusion, President Iliescu says that "our presence at this conference and participation in the proceedings were an opportunity for numerous contacts" with "chiefs of states and governments," and with "a few hundred members of the Romanian community." In connection with the latter group, he says that "we have to make efforts to resume normal links with people who have left the country under various historic circumstances."

In connection with his meetings with "political representatives from neighboring countries," President Iliescu points out that "we expressed our common interest in strengthening our good neighborly relations and in the coming meeting in Istanbul," at which "we will sign an accord on developing not only economic relations in the Black Sea area."

Election Chances for Opposition Viewed
92BA1024A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 21 May 92 p 3

[Article by Raluca Stroe Brumariu: "How Will the Opposition Fare in the Elections?"]

[Text] The role and chances of the opposition in the forthcoming elections were the topic of a debate held on Tuesday 19 May at the offices of the Group for Social Dialogue [GDS]. The discussion was touched off by Mr. Gabriel Liiceanu's report on developments in Romania's political life, with its script directed by the government and accepted by the opposition and with the compromise that is taking shape behind the scenes—the alliance between the Democratic Convention [CD] and the FSN [National Salvation Front] which risks to completely confuse the electorate. Mr. Liiceanu's main question is: Can the opposition participate in a political race in totally unequal conditions? This elicited a variety of answers from the audience. Mr. Liiceanu accused the opposition of having validated, by its presence inside the script, "a contestable denouement, an original sin," and of having accepted lies as "the foundation of the time elapsed since the revolution." The debate was made even more interesting by the fact that a rapprochement solution was sought between the two viewpoints, that of the inflexible intellectual whose primary focus is the criterion of morality in politics, and that of the realistic politician concentrating on political action and electoral success. We will cite here a few opinions expressed by the speakers.

Gabriel Liiceanu: "By accepting the foreseeably unequal chances in the electoral campaign, the opposition is preparing to legitimize a four-year drama. From the beginning, the opposition accepted a game with rules made up by the government and played a walk-on role in a scenario whose ending was already known. The opposition should have based its strategy on truth and fundamental morality. Therefore, the danger of striking a compromise at any cost in order to win the election may be fatal to the opposition, because it will completely confuse the electorate. Accepting the elections at any cost is a fundamental mistake. So far the opposition has already legitimized a string of frauds and falsehoods which culminated in the voting of the Constitution and the legitimization of the republic as state form. The participation in these elections will legitimize the tragedy of a nation within a script that the opposition agrees to join. In 1989 an anticommunist revolution took place, which threw overboard 45 years of illegitimacy, so willy-nilly we came to the issue of the form of government and of recovering the legitimacy of the previous period. For two years we have been living in a profoundly illegitimate situation that we accepted as legitimate. On 23 December 1989, the only logical move would have been to restore the natural history of the constitutional monarchy."

An opposite viewpoint was expressed by Mr. Ioan Coreci (University Solidarity): "Conjunctural alliances do not compromise the moral quality of the CD representatives. In order to be able to change anything in the country, the Convention must win the power. The youth is fed up with waiting for us to win the power and are already being drawn to extremes, something that is very serious."

Dinu Patriciu (National Liberal Party-Young Wing): "The political life is already following a more normal path and the voting machinery no longer works. But we must now consider very thoroughly what will happen if the elections are held in the fall or not held at all. Social tensions will mount and the left wing will take advantage of them with a populist program. By the fall they may well win, and Mr. Campeanu will be the nosegay the government in question will need in its lapel to make it legitimate. However, social convulsions may lead to an authoritarian regime. That is why I think that we need a compromise among all the democratic forces regarding the government program."

Radu Popa: "I do not think that it is immoral to agree to a possible cooperation with the less compromised faction of this government."

Georgy Frunda (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania): "The characteristic of this year's general elections will be absenteeism."

Calin Anastasiu: "Opinion polls show that no one will win a governing majority and that a coalition will be needed. Moreover, were the elections to be held now, neither would the opposition's presidential candidate be able to win a majority in the second round. So the issue of alliances outside the CD must be discussed. I am not sure that we should be so morally inflexible at this time in Romania. What we now need is a political solution in order to get the

other issues moving. We would be better off thinking of this stage in political, rather than moral terms."

Gabriel Liiceanu: "I feel the need for greater vehemence in changing the terms of the competition. We cannot deceive the electorate on account of political considerations."

Mihai Sora: "An electoral alliance does not necessarily have to throw the electorate into confusion. Electoral calculations do not preclude an overt alliance."

Radu Calin Cristea: "If a week from today (19 May—ed. note) the electoral law is not published in MONITORUL OFICIAL, the elections will be held in the fall. How will Mr. Stolojan react to that? He will probably threaten to resign. And I think that the strategy that will be adopted will lead to the dissolution of parliament following the withdrawal of the FSN group and of the opposition from parliament, which will make up half plus one. That would be the best solution. The question is: Will this parliamentary crisis find the opposition with the cards on the table?"

That serious and perfectly realistic question, to which no answer was forthcoming, ended the GDS meeting.

Berceanu on Elections, FSN Leftist Orientation

AU2806164292 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 24 Jun 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Radu Berceanu, vice president of the National Salvation Front, by Paul Dobrescu; place and date not given: "One of Our Problems Was To Distance Ourselves From the Left"]

[Excerpts] [Dobrescu] Mr. Berceanu, did you like the political satire performed by Stela Popescu and Arsinel?

[Berceanu] No. In my view both its form and quality were absolutely implausible. [passage omitted] I do not want you to think that I did not like it because it attacked the National Salvation Front [FSN]. [passage omitted] There was not much humor there.

[Dobrescu] What do you think of the meeting between the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] and Mr. Iliescu?

[Berceanu] Formally, it is a customary meeting. Other parties have also had meetings with the president. They are part of periodic consultations which Mr. Iliescu has to have with all groups. There is nothing to criticize in this.

On the other hand, however, it is clear to me that, bearing in mind that the FDSN supports Mr. Iliescu and his presidential candidacy by all means and that this idea is one of the few actions on which the FDSN relies, the meeting we are talking about was also of another nature. It testifies to the univocal, though undeclared, link between the president and the group most fervently supporting him. In my opinion, it also proved the desire to make this link officially known with a view to using it in counties for propaganda purposes.

[Dobrescu] Several people have told me that deep down in their hearts the Front followers would support Mr. Iliescu,

except that they are faithful to the symbol of the rose. Will this situation turn out to your advantage or that of the FDSN?

[Berceanu] The entire FSN electorate needs more information. From this point of view, our success is quite limited, especially in the countryside but also in the cities. I think that the main thing is whether we will be able to clarify things during visits and meetings, whether we will be able to explain to the electorate what this split is all about, what the genuine position of the FSN is, and so forth. I believe in these direct meetings, because wherever I have been people have understood things, even in counties viewed as some sort of FDSN constituencies.

[Dobrescu] But you have no presidential candidate. This may increase the confusion....

[Berceanu] Part of the electorate has to choose between a candidate and a presumptive candidate, and this confuses many people. We cannot do anything, however. We have a statutory procedure that comes into play and we could not apply it yet because we did not know the date of the elections.

[Dobrescu] I know that you have also had discussions with Mr. Stolojan. Did you at least earn a smile to raise your hopes in connection with his possible candidacy?

[Berceanu] So far, Mr. Stolojan has not taken a clear position. Therefore, we are waiting. [passage omitted]

[Dobrescu] By the way, what other orientation does the FSN have?

[Berceanu] Center-left, especially center. It is very important to clarify our leftist orientation. How far to the left? To distance ourselves from the left was one of our problems. This caused us trouble because the left went as far as the extreme left.

[Dobrescu] Please, do not be offended, but you are talking about the left as if it was something strange and not exactly normal, something that ought to be avoided at least for the time being. Is this natural?

[Berceanu] You know our orientation is a social-democratic one.

[Dobrescu] Does social democracy belong to the left, to the classical left?

[Berceanu] You know, people react to this word left. Their options, however, are actually leftist ones. It is a reaction to the word as such. Within this left, we wanted to distance ourselves more clearly, which in about 10 years may not be needed any more in the sense that we are stressing those features of the left that bring it closer to the center. What we know at this point is that the FDSN is located at our left.

[Dobrescu] Let us say that you will win 25 percent in the elections, the FDSN 20 percent, and the National Liberal Party [PNL] 20 percent. With whom would you form a government?

[Berceanu] This is a very difficult question. With the FDSN it would not be too difficult because their tickets will

probably include people we know well. When he divorces his wife, however, the husband is not inclined, at least for some time, to resume relations. On the other hand, when it comes to our doctrine, we feel closer to the FDSN than to the PNL. I personally am disappointed with the PNL and the way they maneuvered the political boat recently. I would question the correctness of the behavior of certain liberals in a possible coalition.

Gherman on FDSN Electoral, Alliance Strategies
AU2706174392 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL
in Romanian 16 Jun 92 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Oliviu Gherman, Democratic National Salvation Front provisional president, by Andrei Alexandru; place and date not given: "Time Does Not Work in Favor of the National Salvation Front"]

[Text] [Alexandru] The National Salvation Front [FSN] is constantly accusing the Democratic National Salvation Front [FDSN] of trying to have elections postponed until fall. What is your opinion on that?

[Gherman] We wanted to make it possible for the prime minister to keep the promise he made when he took office, that is, to organize elections before June. By the time the draft bills regulating the parliamentary and presidential elections were submitted to Parliament, the assembly was already busy and spent much time on organizing local elections and passing the 1992 budget. Delays in the Chamber of Deputies—discussions always take longer there because of the large number of deputies—made it impossible for us to start mediating between the two parliamentary chambers concerning those articles of the bill on which their opinions diverged. Thus, I would refrain from groundless accusations and from suggesting that we hold elections this summer, in spite of the risk of massive absenteeism. Organizing elections in July would have been tantamount to calling people to work on a Sunday.

[Alexandru] Why do you think that FSN (Petre Roman) insisted that elections should be held now?

[Gherman] I can only guess. It is difficult to think the way they do. The secession of the FDSN and the ongoing desertions from the FSN are probably weakening that party. Time does not work in FSN's favor, because the population is realizing more and more clearly how superficial the Petre Roman administration was and the fact that the current FSN party platform is antidemocratic.

[Alexandru] Speaking of the Roman administration, do you think that the current FSN leadership has any reason to be afraid of the senatorial commission that investigated that administration?

[Gherman] The facts that have been highlighted until now—some of them would fall under the jurisdiction of criminal law—could be enough reason to make some people worry. As seen in the most favorable light for them, those are cases of negligence in handling national property.

[Alexandru] There are certain rumors about an electoral agreement among the National Liberal Party [PNL] and FDSN.

[Gherman] I read an AM PRESS item in your paper which said so. That is mere speculation. We have not elaborated the final version of our platform yet, so we could not possibly tackle the issue of our alliances either. I wish to emphasize that the FDSN will not enter into alliances on account of circumstances, but rather alliances based on philosophical compatibility. During our national convention scheduled for 27 and 28 June, we will be able to discuss our campaign tactics and our long-term strategy concerning alliances.

[Alexandru] According to another rumor, the FDSN wishes to be represented in the government.

[Gherman] So far, we have not made any requests. Nevertheless, considering the fact that this cabinet will have to continue governing until elections are held, it only seems natural to me that there should be a fair representation of the parliamentary political groups in the cabinet. As long as 46 senators and almost 100 deputies belong to the FDSN, our presence in the executive branch would only be natural. That issue will also be discussed during our convention.

[Alexandru] What date would you consider best for scheduling elections?

[Gherman] The end of September.

[Alexandru] How have you been proceeding with the internal organization of your party?

[Gherman] From the quantitative point of view we are satisfied, but certain qualitative problems have cropped up due to the speed at which we have to work. People cannot rid themselves of their ambitions overnight. I can assure you though, that we will be very careful concerning that matter in order to be able to avoid the mistakes made by the FSN, that is, not to accept as members people having doubtful human qualities.

[Alexandru] On 14 June there is going to be a runoff in Iasi for the office of mayor. A number of FSN leaders said that they would not endorse the FDSN candidate against the other candidate backed by the Democratic Convention. Does that show that the FSN is sliding toward the Democratic Convention or perhaps toward the right?

[Gherman] In life one can see divorces handled in a civilized manner, but also those in which every negative assessment possible is made about the former partner. Thus, I do not think that we are dealing with a slide toward the right or left, but with political thoughtlessness. The same applies for labeling FDSN members as neocommunists. Our doctrine does not resemble the communist one at all, but it may well be that when one runs out of constructive arguments, one tends to resort to labeling others.

SRI Seen as Unfit To Open Securitate Files

92BA1077A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 9 Jun 92 p 1

[Article by Nicolae Prelipceanu: "A Neocommunist Industry"]

[Text] Last week's meteoric visit to Bucharest by Pastor Hans-Joachim Gauck, the federal authority in charge of the

State Security (Stasi) documents, for a moment filled our minds with hope. We all saw that it was possible and in a moment of forgetfulness, we added the words "in our country, too." But we came to our senses and looked around. We were the same as before and there was no commission in charge of the Securitate files. The SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] was nothing but the rebaptized Securitate, and so forth.

As long as the files are in the hands of the neocommunist rulers they remain a feared weapon, because they can be used for completely unscrupulous tactics. In Germany, the political police did not have time to falsify the files because they were not allowed time to do it. Here the clocks today even mark the time that Mr. Magureanu and his men are free to fabricate or make files disappear according to the interests of the power they serve. The few months in which neither the Securitate nor the SRI existed—at least in theory—are long past, and even during those months none other but the rulers had the files in hand. Consequently, today the rulers are in a position to furnish endless lists of informers, minus, of course, those kept on for the purposes of the SRI. In these conditions, we wonder: What kind of lists of informers could the SRI provide, when it is practicing the same methods for the same purposes, with the help of (more or less) the same people. It would be as if the Securitate had decided to destroy those who no longer wanted to collaborate by reporting them as informers. We can easily understand that if the lists of Securitate informers were disclosed, they would feature only those who, for one reason or another, got out and were careful to avoid the people in "office." (Just as COTIDIANUL published the list of houses illegally assigned by the Roman Government, except for the house of the newspaper's founder, I. Ratiu. Except that here we are dealing with an absence of elementary common sense—since it would have been natural to suspect that other newspapers would carry the list in its entirety and that the ostrich policy served no purpose but self-discreditation.) Consequently, measures society may take against those of its members who at some point went wrong would be directed only against those who mended their ways, while the real offenders, those who continue to break the law, remain unknown, unpunished, and protected by their masters. I am not pleading for keeping the compromising documents of the Securitate and SRI under lock and key. I only wonder whether anything can still be done to avoid being duped again by some farce as sinister as those involving the terrorists or the miners, the kind of farces which are the speciality of the neocommunist leadership.

The experts in fabricating files, scripts, and tragic farces and the government "analysts" can hardly wait to go back to work. This black battalion must be dissolved in its own poisonous secretions to make sure that its name and traces are gone forever. But although we know only too well what should be done, we are still not doing it. Why? It is perhaps that the above black battalion, with its predecessors in the numbered departments of the Securitate, continues to play some role? If that is so, there is no longer any need to demonstrate why we must hurry as long as there seems to be

still time to completely destroy the Securitate and its vestiges, more dangerous than the waste found in Sibiu or Mehedinti.

Interior Ministry Officer on Role of Police

92BA1083B Bucharest DIMINEATA in Romanian
21 May 92 pp 1, 5

[Interview with Lieutenant General Ion Suceava, head of the Interior Ministry Control Corps, by Doina Donciu; place and date not given: "The Policeman's Profession Is an Art"]

[Text] [Donciu] Your book *In the Service of Truth* aroused unanimous interest. What do you think it was that appealed to the readers?

[Suceava] It is the book of my life, my memoirs, and through this personification I tried to present something that belongs to my generation, the generation of those of us who dedicated our lives to the harsh and beautiful profession of policeman. To make my answer better understood, please quote for the readers what I have on the back cover.

"A person looking at the police from the outside, watching a policeman in the street, may think that we are the happiest people, that we do not have any special worries and problems in our work and lives. The truth is that we were and are like everybody else and have the same problems as everyone else around, perhaps even some more special, tougher problems because of our profession.

"I remember that whenever a murder, robbery, or break-in occurred and I didn't know who the offender was, I felt embarrassed to go out in the street and look people in the eye because the most difficult question I could possibly be asked was: 'Have you apprehended the one who...?' And if I didn't have the answer I felt really ashamed.

"But I am proud to say I experienced that feeling only seldom, even though that cost me days and nights of effort and assiduous work."

[Donciu] Your book makes it clear that the old "militia" was staffed by people who did their duty and served the law, but they also served...Ceausescu. Judging in the light of the present, i.e., of the event of December 1989, what did the former "militia" signify?

[Suceava] The "Militia" was a state body engaged exclusively in common law. Its job was to prevent and apprehend offenders who committed acts of theft, rape, robbery, murder, etc. All police forces in the world have the same duties, but we were also forced to carry out other duties, too (agricultural work, guarding dignitaries, etc.). When all is said and done, these additional "tasks" did not affect the correctness of the police profession.

It is true that by working in the militia in the area of common law, we also served Ceausescu, but in the first place we served the people, whom we protected from everything bad in society.

The December 1989 event was like a liberation for the police, because no one was "ordering" us about any longer. We were allowed to exercise our true profession. For many

months after the revolution and perhaps even now, people did not have sufficient trust in us. I want to believe that such instances of mistrust are isolated and I can responsibly state that they are not justified. Why? It is enough to consider the crime situation to get a correct idea of the number of offenders with whom the police had to contend and continues to contend and of how many of my colleagues even lost their lives in this struggle.

[Donciu] The transition from "militia" to "police" seemed to have been made too easily and enough "room" was apparently left for people who in the best case should have found other...employment. Along this line, do you know of cases of militia personnel who stood trial for their actions?

[Suceava] I think that the transition from militia to police is a process that needs to be explained. First of all, the situation has not changed too much from the viewpoint of our duties. Criminals don't have a political color, so they were and unfortunately continue to be the "social legacy" we fought and continue to fight.

Second, we have been rid of "guidelines," demented orders, and useless tasks. So we are exercising our profession. But the essential element are the people, and on this matter I want to explain to you the situation clearly. Many compromised cadres were removed from our apparatus without reservation. Depoliticization opened up vast possibilities for us to become correctly involved in the social mechanism. The profession of policeman is an art. It takes 10-15 years to shape a good man in this field.

If anyone wanted or wants to completely replace the police apparatus, that would be an irreparable mistake and the ones to suffer would be the...public. As I said, we have clear examples of straight thinking in Spain after Franco's death, or in France after the war. I think that the police are a public asset that must be preserved and defended.

Of course, here we have a profound process of change of the cadres, who are now working in the conditions of a law-governed state, in which they must clearly recognize that they must not make mistakes and that they have only one religion: to serve the law and the citizens. I am referring to the fact that in these conditions, police work is no longer filled with mystery, but is known to and even controlled by the public through the tools of the law-governed state and democracy.

The proof of what I am telling you is that after the revolution some policemen were prosecuted for acts of dishonesty. This is something we don't joke about, because dishonest people have no place in this area. As a matter of fact, no police in the world can boast of having uprooted corruption from its own apparatus, and we even less so, being as we are in a process of change.

[Donciu] What are the relations between the police and the political parties?

[Suceava] We clearly no longer have a "single party" to run everything.

The existence of many political parties is and will remain a reality in our country. The police must maintain perfect

relations with all those parties and must assist them in matters of security, order, and everything they need that is our job to provide. But there must also exist a clear limitation in these relations, namely we must not enroll in any party and must keep an equal distance from all of them. If both sides will respect this, the police will be there for everyone.

The policeman's sole political act is that he has a right to vote like any other Romanian, a right that he will exercise according to his own conscience at the ballot box.

[Donciu] What about relations with the army?

[Suceava] Relations with the army were and will continue to be very good relations of collegiality and cooperation, as is only normal in a law-governed state.

[Donciu] Regarding the observance of human rights, what is your view on police intervention in cases of disorderly conduct?

[Suceava] The situation is very clear in this matter. All international legal instruments in the area of human rights stipulate that our intervention is legal if public order has been violated and if illegal acts were committed. Specifically, any violation of public peace and order, regardless of political coloring, is an act of human rights violation. The police is called upon to intervene within the limits allowed by the domestic laws in effect and in keeping with the norms of humanitarian rights. In fact we see such scenes on television every day and I am sure that many newspapers carry differing views...something like: Why did the police intervene, why did the police not intervene, it was a good thing, it was not a good thing, etc. What is certain is that peace and order are our rights, each one of us, that they must be defended, and that by profession we have to accept the risk of being interpreted in various ways.

[Donciu] King Michael's visit stirred heated discussions pro and against. One thing was evident: The police did its duty impeccably. Please tell our readers whether the visit took place in keeping with the law, whether it overstepped the boundaries of a "private" visit, whether there were any violations of the order; second, what may be the consequences of the fact that the former king passed under the Arch of Triumph?

[Suceava] As a person not involved in political struggles I can tell you that from our viewpoint it was a matter of maintaining public peace and order. Our mission was to ensure that no incident, of any kind, took place. I hope that the police achieved that.

The visiting family was guarded and protected by the British firm Integrated Defense and the Romanian firm Protguard, with our police support. Of course, we could not remain uninvolved because the issue of order is one of the duties of the national police. By a good cooperation with the above firms we correctly carried out our mission.

Upon leaving Otopeni Airport we learned that many citizens had gathered at the Triumph Arch and we wanted to avoid that route. We got in through the Aviatiei District, but after about 200 meters the motorcade stopped. The British

representative asked us to take the route toward the Arch of Triumph—which in fact was his business, because he was in charge of personal security. I have to add that he had already planned the route and that the route was known in the field.

Consequently, the motorcade made for the Arch of Triumph, where the citizens formed a corridor precisely under it.

We had two alternatives: To accept what the crowd wanted, or to provoke a conflict with the crowd and alter the route.

Any self-respecting policeman will avoid a conflict with the crowd, especially when the situation is tense, so the first alternative was the best for achieving what we wanted, order.

First went the TV car, then the traffic vehicle, the guests, and the other cars.

Since there were no official honors, I think that the passage under the Arch proceeded like a normal traffic move, emphasizing the private nature of the visit. The rest was and is nothing but idle speculation.

Problems, Goals of Gypsy Minority Detailed

92BA1083A Bucharest *TINERETUL LIBER*
in Romanian 26 May 92 p 7

[Article by Mircea Florin Sandru: "What Do the Gypsies Want?"]

[Text] It isn't everyday that journalists get to see an (international) king of the Gypsies in the flesh. When he is not traveling on three continents, His Highness Ion Cioaba has his residence in Sibiu. Consequently, the ground floor conference room of the Dorobanti Hotel in Bucharest was filled to capacity. Journalists, attracted by the pompous invitation received from the Royal House (they were already picturing themselves witnessing some operetta-style ceremony) as well as by the problems of the Gypsy minority, had a lot to report because the monarch (for life) and his retinue furnished solid information.

But first a short curriculum vitae of His Majesty: Graduate of elementary school and the vocational school for mechanics-locksmiths; recognized activist for the emancipation of his people; participant in many international meetings of Gypsies, and designated to "shepherd" the "Romany" communities on three continents; winner of numerous international honorary degrees; one of the wealthiest people in Romania; elected king for life at the second National Congress of Gypsies (Sibiu, 5 May 1982).

The Royal House has the status of a legal entity and is officially recognized by Romanian authorities. The Gypsies have a national leadership to which belong the leaders of the recognized political parties of the Gypsies and leaders of county organizations. King Cioaba has a right to recall and replace any of the members of the national leadership. Only persons able to produce a stamped mandate signed by His Majesty Ion Cioaba will be considered for relations with Romanian authorities and authorities of other countries (a voice in the audience: This is pure dictatorship). Attempts to destabilize and fragment the unity of the Gypsy minority

were denounced (at the recent census, 80 percent of the Gypsies in counties with a Hungarian population declared themselves to be Hungarian, after being given money and aid packages).

From a short history presented to the audience we learned that the Gypsies were the descendants of Indian princes (?) and appeared in the Romanian lands more than 600 years ago. They were slaves (good artisans), were set free, and joined their fate to that of the Romanian population and other coinhabiting minorities. Currently the Gypsy community features more than 40 "kinds" of Gypsies (bear tamers, pot makers, musicians, etc.), altogether about 3.5 million persons, of whom 1.5 millions are unemployed or live below the poverty line. Practically speaking, during the transition period, the Gypsies constitute the most disadvantaged class of people:

- They must contend with society's indifference. They have no schools in their own language and lack sufficient means to conserve and popularize their traditions.
- Funds must be allocated from the budget of the central state administration to start comprehensive aid programs for the Gypsy minority.
- Social aid was requested for the elderly and for children who cannot go to school because "they simply have no clothes to put on."
- The land stock bill will have to make some provisions for the Gypsies.
- The government is delaying the negotiation of a contract under which the Gypsies can gather and make some honest money selling berries, mushrooms, snails, frogs, nettles, etc.
- Jobs were requested in the country and abroad for Gypsies trained for various skills and for untrained Gypsies, who can work in agriculture and livestock.
- The request was made to return to the Gypsies the gold coin necklaces confiscated under the communist regime.
- The Gypsies demanded damages from Germany for the loss of human lives and property during the Holocaust (1939-42). Otherwise, 1.2 million Gypsies will attend a protest meeting in Bonn by means known only to themselves.
- The Gypsies' political organizations will coordinate their actions for the forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections with a view to winning at least 20-30 seats in Parliament.
- The country's Presidency is not targeted, nor are there plans to support Mr. Ion Iliescu's candidacy.

Problems in Integrating Abandoned Children
92BA1026A Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA
in Romanian 26 May 92 p 3

[Article by Carmen Antohi: "Abandoned by Family and Society"]

[Text] We are the only country in the world with such a large number of institutionalized children (although some of

them do have families): Over 55,000 children, most of whom encounter countless obstacles in the process of social integration.

A few months ago Mihaela Costescu, director of the Home for School Age Children No. 4, described to me with concern the situation she was facing: Five girls who grew up in her children's home, trained as house painters and horticulturalists, were unable to find jobs despite repeated applications to the Labor Exchange No. 2 of Bucharest. Consequently, she was compelled to continue to provide for them because the girls, who already suffered traumas in their past, could certainly not be put out in the street. Similarly, Catalin Anitoaia and Iordache Cornea, aged 18 and 16, came to the newspaper office to solicit financial help. Like other former students raised at the Tirgu Ocna Children's Home, Bacau County, the two boys dropped out of school for various reasons. We found out that before being expelled because of fairly serious offenses, they had been kept on without having the status of aid recipients (because they were not enrolled in any school). As no job could be found for them, the teachers allowed them to be idle for more than one year and to waste time in which they could have done something useful for their future. But in the coming year the situation will be even worse: The director of the Bacau Children's Home told me that while this year 10 girls who completed various vocational courses could not find jobs, next year 40 girls will graduate and the situation will be utterly disastrous. What is to be done? Various solutions were suggested at the national colloquium of children's homes directors. Obviously all the responsible factors must pool their efforts together because this is a category of already traumatized children, and letting them simply roam the streets would be a crime.

Currently, the profile of this category of institutionalized children is not well enough understood at the schools in which they are enrolled: Many are treated as if they came from schools for delinquents and are ignored. They may indeed be difficult children, but they are certainly not responsible for the emotional traumas they suffered. The director of the Tulcea Children's Home made a noteworthy suggestion: Pedagogical magazines could start a campaign to explain the specific problems of psychologically and socially traumatized children raised in homes—that is, abandoned by their natural parents—thus endeavoring to foster closeness between teachers and children and to help the former understand the psychology of institutionalized children. If the teachers will treat them with affection, the students will in turn relate to them differently. Wherever the local authorities have shown intelligence and interest, solutions have been found. In Slatina, Olt, for example, in the past two and a half years, the children's home has been operating as a general school. Thus, children with families in the neighborhood go there every day and attend regular school classes. The home children were thus happily integrated because the neighborhood children attended all programs, festivities, and trips together with the children without a family, who were no longer discriminated against.

Sorin Cristea, minister state secretary, said efforts must be made to ensure that educators can influence students by

better understanding their specific psychology. Along this line, children's home educators must offer psychological compensations for emotionally and socially handicapped institutionalized children. Teams of specially trained educators should be able to hold classes for parents of general and high school children facing similar problems. The ministry will begin to organize psychology courses at the local level. Psychological-pedagogical help is a key concept for ensuring a decent future for abandoned children.

Another issue is teaching children how to work. The local authorities must assist the directors of children's homes by providing plots of land and workshops with specific jobs and earnings commensurate to the work done. For that, however, we must urgently improve the legal framework of operation of those institutions.

As Minister State Secretary Sorin Cristea said, since we do not yet have an education bill, the educators and teachers, in conjunction with the local parliament members, must pave the way for passing laws that will help them and ensure a safe future for the children. Unfortunately, at this time we do not have the necessary legal foundation for providing for children in vocational schools and apprentice programs. The director of the Children's Home of Cimpia Turzii cited the example of one of his students who passed the entry exam for a drivers school. However, the annual tuition cost is 60,000 lei. It is not clear yet who will pay it and out of what funds. Also, regulations must be worked out so that each child can enroll in a school under a cooperation system.

The idea of an "education community" or "support community" made up of factors that can contribute to placing graduates of vocational schools into jobs and can support the children's homes by organizing specific workshops and providing agricultural land, etc., is a must. The factors involved are primarily the mayor and prefect, the Guardianship Authority, directors of enterprises employing such youth, etc. However, such communities will be able to operate only by wielding special laws, as is the case in all the countries with a market economy. One requirement along this line is to pass a sponsorship bill under which economic enterprises that provide financial aid to children's homes will benefit from tax cuts. Legal economic levers must be utilized so that the children's homes directors can be helped to resolve the problems they have to deal with.

The implementation of the Land Stock Bill must also take into account the needs of some children's homes directors regarding the reintegration of some of their graduates in the communes in which they were born or from which their natural parents came. If a child does not want to return to the family that abandoned him, he should be helped by the commune mayor and by the other inhabitants to work a plot of land and establish a holding.

At the national colloquium I attended, several directors expressed dissatisfaction about the manner in which the press presents their enormously complex problems, which require intense dedication and are so difficult to resolve.

The fact that the press has published only negative examples dealt a painful blow to well-meaning directors who invest their lives and energies into educating and raising children.

We were reproved for the fact that in many homes the children took advantage of what they read in the press and a damaging atmosphere of divisiveness was created among them. Honest and devoted directors felt that they had been thrown into the same pot as those whose abuses we revealed.

But did those who raised those issues with the journalists attending consider the fact that the directors we criticized in our papers had no right to still hold their positions and to be in the audience—in view of the fact that we did not receive any official disclaimer to the effect that the thefts and abuses we wrote about did not take place? That would have been the only way to distinguish between honest directors and those who violated the law. But since the law took no action, the press was used as a scapegoat!

Rights of Foreign Investors Under Land Law

*92BA1027A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 22 May 92 pp 1-2*

[Article by Florin Scricciu, director of the Legislation Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry: "The Principal Real Rights Over Land Allowed To Be Purchased by Foreign Investors"]

[Text] A number of issues have emerged in practice regarding the principal real rights allowed to foreign investors—legal bodies or natural persons—over any kind of land parcels located in Romania.

The interest shown by foreign investors—legal bodies or natural persons—to invest in Romania prompted and continues to prompt us to try to present certain considerations, in compliance with and within the confines of the present regulations, regarding the real principal land rights that may be acquired by such persons.

As is known, the issue of protecting the right of foreign citizens to own property and to acquire such rights was settled in Romania's Constitution, as well as by other special laws.

Thus, Article 41 par. 2 of the Constitution stipulates that "private property will be equally protected by the law, regardless of who is the owner." The same paragraph stipulates, however, that "foreign citizens and stateless persons may not acquire the right to own land."

Although such regulations were adopted prior to the Constitution, they were echoed by the provisions featured in the Land Stock Bill No. 18/1991 and the bill on foreign investments, No. 35/1991.

Thus, Article 47 of Law No. 18/1991 stipulates that "natural persons who do not carry Romanian citizenship and do not reside in Romania, and legal entities that do not carry Romanian nationality and do not have their headquarters in Romania may not acquire in ownership any kind of land by transactions between living persons."

In addition to provisions for acquiring land by means of transactions among living persons, the same article (par. 2) requires that legal entities and natural persons envisaged in par. 1 relinquish any land they may have inherited before the enactment of the law (No. 18/1991).

Article 1 letter d of the law on foreign investments No. 35/1991 stipulated that "Acquiring the right of ownership over chattels, real estate, or other real rights, with the exception of the right of ownership over land," constitutes a foreign investment in Romania.

Those were consequently the "confines of the law" and its "restrictions" concerning the right of foreign persons to own any kind of land.

However, to stop at "listing" the regulations that prohibit foreigners from acquiring ownership rights over land, without any further expalantions, would deprive the experts, and in many situations those interested, including foreign citizens, of understanding how they can benefit by such provisions by correlating them with other regulations.

The legal correlative provisions are primarily those featured in Law No. 18/1991 itself, in Law No. 35/1991, in the Constitution (other than those cited), and in Laws No. 15/1990, 31/1990, the law on the legal system regarding constructions No. 50/1991, and the Civil Code.

According to the provisions of Law No. 35/1991 (Article 3) "foreign investors" are not synonymous with "foreign persons." A foreign investor has his residence and/or headquarters abroad, whereas a foreign person is described by the absence of the attribute of Romanian citizenship as a natural person and the absence of the attribute of being a Romanian legal entity.

In every case, in accordance with the provisions of Law No. 31/1990 (Article 1) "commercial associations with head offices in Romania are Romanian legal entities." Consequently, commercial associations made up of foreign investors and Romanian natural persons or legal entities are also Romanian legal bodies.

The question is whether land ownership rights may constitute a form of contribution to investment capital if, in compliance with the provisions of Article 31 of Law No. 35/1991, foreign investment in Romania is made through a commercial company in association with Romanian natural persons or legal entities.

The answer can only be positive, since the Romanian associate, whether a natural person or legal entity, can use as his capital investment share both his land ownership right and other real rights over land throughout the life span of the commercial association in question.

Consequently, the latter association—a Romanian legal entity (with foreign participation)—becomes holder of the right of ownership over the land. Evidently, this solution is also favorable to the foreign partner (investor) in the commercial association, in the situations and methods of foreign investment cited in Article 1 letters a, b, g, and h of Law No. 35/1991.

However, foreign investors may also acquire real estate rights, too, including over land (Article 1 point d Law No. 35/1991), evidently with the exception of ownership rights.

One of those real estate rights is of course the right to concession stipulated in the Constitution (Article 135), in Laws No. 15/1990 (Article 25), 18/1991 (Articles 4 and 25), and 50 and 69/1991.

Similarly, we believe that foreign investors may also acquire—without any restriction or limitation, in accordance with the Civil Code (the common law)—additional real principal rights over land such as life interest (Articles 517-564), utilization (Articles 565-571), superficiaries (Article 492), and easements (Articles 576-643), those being derivations of the right of ownership.

Thus, even within the limitations and restrictions of the regulations cited, there are enough reasons why foreign investors should invest in Romania.

Economic Problems of Livestock Complexes

92P20307A Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian
28 May 92 p 2

[Interview with Ovidiu Grasu, state secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, by Iosif Pop; place and date not given: "Five Burning Questions Related to the Existence of Producers"]

[Text] [Pop] What is the explanation for the fact that, under conditions in which the government has allocated to agriculture the necessary funds for paying off the debts of units to various suppliers, a large number of livestock complexes are, once again, suffering from a complete cut-off of funds?

[Grasu] First of all, something has to be made clear: These compensatory funds have been transformed, in reality, into production credits which must be paid back in installments within six months at the most. In reality, what are the financial consequences of this reimbursable aid for the activity of the units? In the absence of revolving funds of their own, the livestock complexes are forced to buy both compensatory credits and credits sought for current production activity. How was this possible? In the first place, by a strong increase in production and, especially, in labor productivity. Another way was to increase prices to ensure a level of profit which would permit the repayment of compensatory credits. Since none of these conditions could be achieved, and the budget would not permit an increase in subsidies for agriculture, we are faced, today, with the same difficult financial situation which caused the economic blocking of funds at the end of last year.

[Pop] These days, two diametrically opposed opinions on the existence of livestock complexes are circulating. One of them comes from outside agriculture and aims at the liquidation of these gigantic units, which are thought to be bankrupt in their method of organization and operation. Unfortunately, the current financial state of these units only strengthens the belief that many complexes will not become profitable even after new contract and purchase prices are enacted.

[Grasu] From many directions, including some political forces, a real offensive has been conducted against these complexes. In addition, those of us in the ministry are accused of carrying out all sorts of economic illegalities in

order to favor them over private producers. However, in the concrete situation existing at the present time, the private sector which holds more than 80 percent of the agricultural land in the country, provides only 25 percent of the meat, less than one-half of the milk, and about 10 percent of the poultry and eggs. These yields are, in general, much lower than in past years, as a result of the disturbing decline of the large complexes. Despite the massive transfer of animals to the private sector, this sector's contribution to the establishment of the national supply of agricultural and food products remains at an especially low level. There are many causes and their nature is so complex that I, myself, will not dare to give an explanation. As poorly as the large livestock complexes might operate, they are absolutely necessary and must be assisted by all means so that they can produce massive yields.

[Pop] We have some figures on production costs in some representative units which clearly show that the current contract prices are lower than the expenditures incurred by the agricultural producers. For example, in the two large hog fattening complexes, in Ialomita and Braila, the production price per kilogram of meat on the hoof is 265 lei while the contract price set by the ministry is only 170 lei. Similar differences exist in the case of cattle and fowl, not to mention milk, where the price is barely one-half the price in effect on the peasant market.

[Grasu] The figures which you present might have a real basis, but it should be kept in mind that agriculture represents the basic factor in the implementation of the government's policy of social protection. In contrast to industry, where the negotiation of prices was based on the average costs of production incurred by the economic units in the respective branch, in agriculture, a price considered to be a maximum limit was taken as a reference point. In regard to hogs, for example, the price of one kg of meat on the carcass does not exceed 300 lei. As a result, agriculture must keep within a maximum range and cannot exceed its limits, regardless of the cost of producing the meat. A line has been drawn below this maximum level and, by the application of coefficients of transformation, a contracting price of 170 lei per kg is obtained.

[Pop] The producers say that, in those countries in which parameters are achieved which are much higher than those achieved in Romania, the state doubles the price at which

the meat is sold on the free market. We have a list of such prices in effect in Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy. The explanation lies in the subsidy policy, which we seem to profit from in the case of meat imports. Under such conditions of foreign sponsorship, it is clear that our livestock sector cannot stand up to foreign competition. Is it true, as farmers say, that there is some interest in leaving the country's food security to the import of agricultural and food products?

[Grasu] The truth is that the economy is experiencing an especially difficult time and the upheavals which various industrial branches are suffering are reverberating, especially upon agriculture which is caught in a vice which is gripping it with unprecedented financial severity. Our discussion has been concentrating on the fate of the large livestock complexes. However, the individual farms are caught in the same financial suffocation. It would be illusory to believe that the peasants will sell their products at the contracting prices which we have set. They will head toward the liberal market where the relationship between supply and demand will give another value to their work. The ordinary man, families with limited financial resources will have to suffer because of this expansion of the peasant market. The option of supplying the country with imported food products will have to be abandoned because of our financial insolvency.

[Pop] What do you think must be done to take agriculture out of the impasse in which it is in now?

[Grasu] We should help peasants to work the soil, providing them with good quality seeds, fertilizers, diesel oil, and machines which work fast and well. In May about 500,000 hectares still had to be plowed and only 2.5 million hectares, out of 6.5 million hectares, were sown. Consumers are justifiably horrified in regard to the new prices for food products. But we have not heard any politician call for the interpellation of those who raised the price of a kg of diesel oil almost 20 times or because the price of a liter of mineral water is twice that of milk. Food is vital for our existence and cannot be judged on the basis of the prices of other products. But we must not forget that 70 percent of the expenses in agriculture come from outside this branch, and if it is not possible to monitor these expenses properly then it is the duty of parliament to adopt legislative measures for subsidizing these financial residues that are such a burden on the cost of agricultural products.

'Nearsightedness' of West's Policy on Bosnia

92BA1129B Zagreb NOVJ VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
11 Jun 92 p 2

[Article by Radovan Stipetic]

[Text] Margaret Tutwiler's statement is shocking not only because of what it says but even more so because of what it alludes to. At first, her statement seems logical when she says how it makes no sense for America (or anyone else) to send its "good guys" to the Sarajevo inferno to risk their lives for the sake of someone else.

However, the statement by the State Department spokeswoman becomes questionable when she states that it makes no sense for the American Air Force to deliver food, by parachute, to the citizens of Sarajevo, who already have started to die of starvation, since "it would be very difficult to make sure that the food gets into the hands of those who need it most." Forty-seven years ago I saw food thrown from American airplanes flying in the skies above Sarajevo. Then, it was also questionable whether all those parachutes with food would get into the hands of those "who needed it most," but food kept arriving following logic that Washington today obviously does not understand. Except for food, what mattered most, both then and now, is the gesture, a reminder as to which side powerful America really supports, a gesture that even half a century ago was well understood by everyone, and that would also be understood today, if American aircraft were to appear in the skies over Sarajevo.

But, let us return to the "good guys" in order to convince ourselves that the logic of statements by Mrs. Tutwiler (Mr. Zimmermann, or other prominent persons from over there) is not only questionable but also very nearsighted.

If the "good guys" do not help in removing Milosevic, then there are three possible future developments. First, where the criminal will be either thrown out of power by his countrymen who, in the end, will realize that they themselves have been accomplices in the crime—this is not very likely to happen. The second possibility is that Milosevic continues his destruction and killing, spreading horror from one Serbian neighbor to another. And, the third possibility is that the neighbors themselves, once they realize that the "good guys" are not coming, and aware that their own individual forces are not up to dealing with the criminal, will join forces and attack together.

The third possibility would lead to the third Balkan war, and surely be the introduction to a third world war. This would be, we believe, sufficient evidence to show the selfishness and nearsightedness in the logic of statements made by Mrs. Tutwiler, Mr. Zimmermann, and others. If you do not send food now, and if you do not send "good guys" to help those who "need it most," you will have to launch missiles and bombs on those who justly deserve them.

Relations With Slovenia Seen Cooling

AU0807082692 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jun 92 p 2

[Commentary by Milan Jajcinovic: "Prejudice and Trivialities"]

[Text] Nations have always had stereotyped ideas and prejudices about other nations, something they believe to be so. The English are thought to be reserved and cold, the Italians babbling and noisy, the Germans diligent and zealous, the Montenegrins lazy.... Among such stereotypes the Slovenes appear as selfish, calculating, and parsimonious. If a survey of public opinion were conducted in Croatia on what the Slovenes were like, the results would doubtless produce those said stereotypes.

Many people in Croatia and in Slovenia are inclined to describe the present political relations between Croatia and Slovenia as cooling. Although at a recent meeting between Slovene politicians and Croatian journalists, Dr. Jozef Pucnik, vice prime minister of Slovenia, said that it was in bad taste to talk about the cooling of relations, because it is only a case of "returning reality" caused by the creation of independent states, it is still hard to escape the impression that there is definitely some degree of cooling. The short "romantic phase," which started during the "fight for liberation," has been replaced by a not so idyllic phase. This new period in Croatian and Slovene relations is burdened by a series of problems. Some say that the reasons go back to Tito's Yugoslavia, and others maintain that the problems have arisen from the fact that Croatia and Slovenia are now independent countries. But can all present problems between Slovenia and Croatia be so ascribed? Is there not something evasive, something that cannot be explained by old or new realities?

Croatian foreign currency bank accounts with the Ljubljanska Bank, Slovene fishing in Croatian waters, the Sentilj-Zagreb highway, the Krsko nuclear power station, the agreement on economic cooperation with Slovenia unratified by parliament, Slovene property in Croatia, unequal trade exchange, and the recent "Dedic case"—all these are fundamental, and some unsolved, problems between the two countries. There are those in Slovene political and public life (as there are in Croatian as well) who are inclined toward severe judgments and solutions. They, for example, never fail to bring up the question of borders as the most important problem in the relations between Croatia and Slovenia, as something that can no longer be delayed. Even at the meeting between Slovene politicians and Croatian journalists—all the most prominent people from the Slovene political leadership were present—almost all the politicians spoke of borders as disputable.

What is disputable about the borders between Croatia and Slovenia? The meeting in Ljubljana failed to produce concrete answers. Only Milan Kucan was more specific when he said that the Slovene claim concerned mostly the correction of sea borders. How should they be corrected? Probably in a way that would allow Slovenia access to international waters, since Slovene ships can now leave port only into Croatian or Italian waters. The more liberal and patient faction in Slovene politics (to which Kucan belongs) believes that talks should be held with Croatia on every matter, particularly economic cooperation, and also borders. But they hold that talks have to wait since Croatia is still at war and very sensitive to any question of borders, particularly if they are said to be disputed. However, there is

another faction, an impatient and uncompromising one, that wants to draw borders with Croatia now, and in any way it pleases. Such impatient Slovene attempts—and any mention of disputable borders—will doubtless further infuriate the Croatian public, which has already been aggravated by the freezing of foreign currency accounts with Ljubljanska Bank.

Meanwhile, the Croatian public has had additional reasons to feel exasperated with some moves by Slovene politicians and journalists, particularly at the erection of bunkers on the border, the undenied information that Slovenia regularly supplied the Yugoslav People's Army with steel for tanks during the fiercest attacks on Croatia, Slovenia's initial refusal to accept refugees, and some recent journalistic insinuations that the Croatian authorities were behind Ibrahim Dedic and the counterfeit tolar affair. All this has obviously influenced relations between Croatia and Slovenia. It has helped the revival of the stereotype that Slovenes are parsimonious, selfish, petty, and xenophobic.

After the fishing ban was imposed on Slovene fishermen, there was renewed talk in Slovenia that "it is impossible to deal with the Croats." This and suchlike are probably the reason the parliament has not yet ratified the agreement on economic cooperation, which has been ratified by the Slovene Assembly, and why the Croatian Government has not yet made any comment on the 15 points that the Slovene Government regards as crucial to the relations between the two countries. However, it would be too simplistic to try and explain everything by the Slovene political pettiness or the renewed Croatian prejudices. These have an indisputable effect on relations between the two countries, but they should not be the things that determine these relations. This should be in everyone's interest.

Elections Allegedly Scheduled for 26 Jul

*92BA1105C Zagreb VECERNJI LIST
in Serbo-Croatian 14 Jun 92 p 3*

[Article by Dunja Ujevic: "Elections on 26 July!?"]

[Text] Unless something extraordinary happens, elections will be held in Croatia on 26 July. The decision on this came down, it is said, this week in a meeting behind closed doors of the incumbent party's top leadership. The decision on the date for holding the last session of the Assembly during this season was also changed accordingly. The Assembly will hold its last meeting in its present makeup before the end of this month instead of the first week of July (reportedly the last week in June). In that session, in accordance with campaign logic, the Croatian parliament will adopt a decision dissolving itself.

Although it is not mandatory for the elections to be proclaimed in the Assembly, in view of the date envisaged for holding them, it might be expected that they would be announced from the speaker's stand in the parliament. In that case, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic, would address the Assembly and announce the elections to the parliament, and the prime minister, Dr. Franjo Greguric, would announce elections for president of the Republic.

In this decision on the elections, the incumbent party has decided to terminate the war of nerves with the opposition, which, looking back, has also had certain mandatory elements of a classic detective novel. We recall how long Dr. Tudjman, bandying about imprecise statements about when the elections could be held, would tighten and then relieve the tension of his political opponents. Then, suddenly, almost out of time and space, Dr. Franjo Greguric was sent into the game and in a press conference announced all but the exact hour of the elections—the end of July. And then when all those interested had taken the prime minister's statement almost at face value because of the prestige of his office, and adapted their behavior accordingly, Dr. Tudjman repeated the new-old refrain about how when the last foot of territory is liberated.... All of a sudden, there was no longer a trace of Greguric's "end of July," from which the erroneous conclusion was drawn that the rulers had gone too far. Had the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] stuck to the most recent decisions, Dr. Greguric would turn out to have been the character in the detective novel who furnishes such a convincing description of the crime that he is automatically rejected as unconvincing.

What will be the opposition's first move now? Attempt to clear up at least some of the things unclear in the election rules if that can at all be done in such a short time (and more than time is lacking), or first to come down hard on the very decision that the elections should be in late July? Will all the well-known arguments against the elections be rounded out with the overall question: Does this mean that the last foot of Croatian soil will be liberated by 26 July? The question is in order, but also completely superfluous, because nothing essential will change. Incidentally, the best answer to that question is the fact that only half of the parliament will be chosen, and the other half (the Chamber of Parishes) subsequently. So, if the elections are on 26 July, up until 26 June there must be concentration on the basic rules, which are still unknown. It is really not possible to participate in elections if one does not know whether a candidate for president of the Republic can also run on the party list for the Assembly, or if the fog is not lifted from the voter lists, if it is not known by what procedure the refugees will vote, if the election rights of Croats in the entire diaspora are not known, and so on. Finally, even though it might be in vain, perhaps they should insist once again on multiparty election commissions, at least to make it known that any other solution is below the level which in the first elections was accepted even by the odious communist regime.

There is certainly more of that, but one thing is certain: We will not find the days to come boring. If it is not another trick by the HDZ, the propaganda machinery and election forecasts will begin to make a lot of noise. And the voters? One colleague wrote the other day that in view of the situation both the government and the opposition are ready for these elections, but not the people. Perhaps precisely for that reason there could be a better chance in the elections for those who in the name of piety will not be making too much noise.

Defense Ministry Denies Involvement in Bosnia

AU0807082492 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA
in Serbo-Croatian 23 Jun 92 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Aggressor Is Known to Everyone"]

[Text] Zagreb—"After frequent reports by certain foreign information services on units of the Croatian Army taking part in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we feel free to strongly deny such allegations. Once again we claim that units of the Croatian Army are not on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina," states a statement issued by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia.

"The Republic of Croatia has allowed all soldiers in the Croatian Army who come from Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who have worked or fought in the Republic of Croatia, to take leave and defend their families and homes against the same greater Serbian aggressor against whom they fought in the Republic of Croatia.

"In conversations that these people have among themselves, they frequently mention the units of the Croatian Army to which they once belonged, which—to the ignorant, the malevolent, and those with a shallow approach to the problem—gives the impression that Croatian Army units are taking part in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"This constant insistence that the Croatian Army is present in Bosnia-Herzegovina is obviously the latest attempt by the Serbian-Chetnik propaganda machine to give a false impression to the world, and thus attenuate guilt for all their aggressive and barbaric destruction and crimes, and even accuse the Croatian Army and the Republic of Croatia of involvement in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"The statement by President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina clearly confirms who the aggressor is against Bosnia-Herzegovina, in addition to the important fact that the Republic of Croatia has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent and sovereign state.

"We invite all journalists who wish to have an insight into the real state of affairs to contact us. We will enable them to examine our assertions," concludes the statement issued by the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia.

Croatia's Risks in Freeing Dubrovnik Area

92BA1112F Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
12 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by Suad Ahmetovic: "To Prevlaka Through Trebinje"]

[Text] A look at Dubrovnik and its surroundings from the enemy strongholds. The Croatian army cannot go to the territory of sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina, from which Vucurevic's cannons are destroying Dubrovnik. How, then, can the Dubrovnik knot be untied?

Dubrovnik—Without the complete military defeat of the notorious Trebinje SAO [Serbian Autonomous Region] president, truckdriver Bozidar Vucurevic, there can be no talk of stopping the bestial devastation of Dubrovnik, and even less of freeing Konoval in the eastern part of the

Dubrovnik opcina, which is under occupation by the "army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]." This was also confirmed by the latest attack, when the artillery of Vucurevic's "Herzegovina corps" from the direction of Trebinje, together with the forces of the Podgorica corps and the Yugoslav naval sector for Boka from occupied Cilipi, devastated Dubrovnik.

The uninformed will therefore wonder why the Croatian army does not make an advance onto the territory of the neighboring state, and drive the enemy far from the Croatian border with a violent counterattack, since after the occupier suffered serious defeats in the western part of the Dubrovnik opcina and withdrew from the strategic locations above Dubrovnik itself, favorable conditions have been created for responding to the enemy in kind.

Croatia, however, has recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state, and so for that very reason it cannot send its own army onto its territory, even though Dubrovnik is being continually threatened from that territory. Serbia and Montenegro, which have not recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, could hardly wait to be able to show the world how Croatia has intervened in the war on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the same way as they and their "FRY army" have done. How long, then, will such an exhausting situation for the residents of Dubrovnik continue, and in general, how can the "Dubrovnik knot" be untied?

In view of the current military and strategic situation, the Croatian army cannot embark upon the liberation of Konoval without very great risks. Specifically, Vucurevic's Cetniks have strong fortifications in the immediate vicinity of Dubrovnik, and could get behind the backs of the Croatian defenders, who would thus find themselves between two ground fires reinforced from the sea by the action of Yugoslav naval vessels. The closest and most dangerous Cetnik stronghold is on Golubov Kamen, above the source of the Ombla itself, from which cannon fire is being opened against the suburban settlement of Mokosic and the other towns of Rijeka Dubrovačka. The Cetniks have also established themselves in Ivanica and Uskoplje, also next to the state border itself. The coastal zone on the extreme southeastern part of Croatia is very narrow, and in the section between Srebreni and Mlin there are less than three kilometers from the sea to the state border. The army could curb an attempt by the Trebinje Cetniks to penetrate through Ivanica by firing from Brat, Zarkovica, and Dupac, but penetrations can also be expected through the Visocnik pass, the lower slopes of Snjeznica, and the Javor pass.

Nevertheless, there is an effective solution for neutralizing the pressure from the direction of Trebinje. The HVO [Croatian Defense Council] fighters, who virtually liberated the entire reestablished Bosnia-Herzegovina opcina of Ravno by penetrating through Neum, should not think that their final goal has thereby been achieved. The Trebinje truckdriver will not easily reconcile himself to the loss of part of his planned duchy, and so he will continue to attack Ravno. The only way for Vucurevic to be taught his well-deserved lesson for all his crimes against the Croatian and Muslim peoples is a determined continuation of the HVO's

penetration through Popovo Polje and the liberation of Trebinje from the Cetniks. The criticisms from the Belgrade and Podgorica aggressors that Croatia has interfered in the war on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina through the HVO are already void, since influential international political circles have already recognized the HVO as spontaneous resistance by the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Serbian and Montenegrin aggression. The HVO forces recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, and are fighting for that state, just like the Bosnia-Herzegovina Territorial Defense, with which it will someday create a Bosnia-Herzegovina army.

[Box, p 6]

Nebulous Threats From the Yugoslav Generals

When Bozidar Vucurevic "takes to his heels" from his unpredestined Trebinje capital, Major General Radomir Damjanovic, who is now "responsible" for the warfare of the "FRY army" in Konavli, will have to consider carefully: Either he will withdraw from Croatian territory himself, or he will be forced to do so by the Croatian Army. With the neutralization of pressure from the Herzegovina zone, the Croatian Army, in a frontal advance, will be able to destroy the cannon fortifications of the "FRY army" above Plat, near Cilipi, and near Grude, and liberate all of Konavli, including the Prevlaka peninsula.

In spite of the nebulous threat by General Damjanovic to the Croatian Army that he is only "allowing" it to deploy to the Brgat-Dubac line (about four kilometers from Dubrovnik), the Croatian defenders are already moving throughout the entire Dubrovnik parish.

Slovene Daily Attacked for Anti-Croatian Bias

92BA1104B Zagreb NOVI VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian
19 Jun 92 p 3

[Article by Marjan Jurleka: "Production of Scandal"]

[Text] Stick your finger in the ocean, and you are in touch with the whole world. That is what my elders told me in Sibenik Bay. Today, I know that it is so unless international maritime law tells you otherwise. And that is precisely where the disputes between Slovenia and Croatia have piled up, exploding in past days with new ferocity in the Slovene media. Slovenia has border problems with Croatia. Croatia has border problems with Slovenia. The national pride of the Slovenes was most directly injured by the passage of "Elan" into Croatian hands. Slovenia owes Croatian savers \$700 million through the vaults of the Bank of Ljubljana. Croatia is directly to blame for the problems which it has with Slovenia because it did not ratify numerous intergovernmental agreements, a job which the Slovene parliament has already completed.

Those four points summarize the governmental "problems" between Croatia and Slovenia. All the rest is hysteria of domestic (Slovene) newsmen who (especially in DELO Independent Daily for an Independent Slovenia) nurture a particular style in preparing their articles concerning Croatia, but also a harsher line in commenting on relations between the two states. The tone, which is always elevated,

is not always on the track of official Slovene policy. And why should it be? There is obviously a disagreement here, because quite often DELO is read in Croatia as though it were a government paper, but it is not, at least when it comes to relations between Croatia and Slovenia.

Government delegations of the two states were to meet early last week, and the Slovene prime minister, Drnovsek, declared that Slovenia understands the problems which Croatia has because of the war, that relations between the two states must be friendly and good neighborly, that they want smooth relations. Pucnik spoke in a meeting with Croatian newsmen about a new phase of intergovernmental relations. Realism, optimalization, new technologies for smoothing out relations, the transition from declarativeness to specific projects—those were the terms which the deputy Slovene prime minister used. And Mr. Kucan, president of the state, himself said in speaking about relations between the two states that they are "problematical" in only one segment—the economic, and that is quite specific. The Croatian Assembly has not ratified the intergovernmental economic agreement. That is what official Slovenia is saying.

And it was precisely in that atmosphere of discussion and agreement soto braco that several articles appeared in DELO on 18 June which might erroneously lead the uninformed reader to the conclusion that these are states which have cool relations and no economic cooperation whatsoever.

"Who Counterfeited Tolars," "A Scandal Quite Comparable With Agrokomerc," "Is It Really an Accident That the Headquarters of Promdel Banka Is Near the National Bank of Croatia?," "Excitable' Neighborhood," "Pact Between Poor Men"—these are the headlines of articles in which the editors are dealing with Croatia and Slovene-Croatian relations. There are three kinds of articles. One studies the background of the scandal with the counterfeited tolars. These are newspaper reports to which the editors have grafted their own embellishments without authentic basis in the articles. The "bad" article of Boris Jez, editor and columnist in DELO, belongs to the second kind; this is a hysterical anti-Croatian assemblage of words which skims over the surface of the essence of the Slovene-Croatian dispute (the Croatian equivalent might be an editorial in ST). The third type is the column by Peter Potocnik in which he looks into the scope and international implications of the "pact between poor men," B-H [Bosnia-Herzegovina] and Croatia. This is an article which stresses two points—that the Croatian side is proclaiming the Serbs to be the aggressor (the author anchors his neutrality in that argument) and that the "young democracy's" problems in understanding democracy cannot be concealed by any kind of alliances.

A current dispute within the editorial offices (it would be an overstatement to say that there is a split among the editors), which can be detected above all in the editorial columns, might serve as an illustration in understanding the position of DELO in the Croatian-Slovene "dispute" (the segment which might intrigue the Croatian public). Danilo Slivnik, acting editor in chief, and Janko Lorenci, editor of the

Saturday supplement, thus explain the positions of the two (at least) opposed camps in their consecutive editorials. The newsman close to DEMOS (Slivnik) and the one close to the Liberals (Lorenci) explained the opposing conceptions of the future of Slovenia. The current situation in the "Independent Daily for an Independent Slovenia" is described by MLADINA, which refers to the paper as DE LO.

Relations between Slovenia and Croatia are far from splendid, but no worse than relations between Slovenia and Italy. They should be understood in the context of the Croatian fixation on the plague from the east, its absorption in domestic economic and political problems (above all in the context of the announced-unannounced elections and

the de facto election campaign), which marginalize the "problems" on the western borders, and Slovene obstinacy as far as neighbors are concerned, its obsession with its former position in the former state and with the conflict of political and economic pragmatism, which on the Slovene side result in an impatient stamping of the foot beneath the negotiating table, and in the media they quite often take the form of outbursts of anti-Croatism at the lowest level. It is thus not a good idea, especially for the Croatian side, to let such articles dissuade one from peeking under the veil that covers the face in the belief that this is a protection against ugliness, when this is a beauty with whom one could make a good marriage.

President Criticizes Obstructionism in Parliament
 92BA1128A Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 16 Jun 92 p 2

[Article including interview with France Bucar, president of the Slovene Assembly, by Jana Taskar; place and date of interview not given: "We Will Get Into a Situation That Is Legal Suicide!"]

[Text] *A danger that we do not have any real idea about; a presidential dictatorship would be unconstitutional; "I have statements in writing about withdrawing signatures for the referendum."*

Ljubljana, 15 Jun—"It would be possible to make progress on something in parliament only if the parliamentary parties agreed on normal state-building conduct and subordinated their own interests to general state interests. If we cannot agree on this, tragedy awaits us. We will end our process of state independence, which we began so beautifully in accordance with the legal system, just as it started in East Europe with the Romanian case. The public should be told this and given a clear idea of the extreme seriousness of this problem, and responsible behavior by deputies should be demanded, since the state's interests have to be above the parties' interests. We are now acting in a completely Balkan way. If the behavior in parliament does not change and if those who are blocking its work do not come to their senses, I see the future as being very black," Slovene Assembly President Dr. France Bucar stated in an interview for DELO, before the continuation of a very important session of the Slovene Assembly—they were to decide on the property and electoral legislation.

"Our state still has to be constituted; we cannot build statehood straight on the constitution. It is abstract and general, and contains only the basic principles. What is in it can only be put into effect by a whole series of laws. In particular, we need a law on the government, one on the state administration, and a series of economic laws. If parliament does not pass them, we almost cannot speak of the establishment of a new state through elections. Should we elect a new 90-member State Assembly that will be confronted by a 25-member government? How is that Assembly to be constituted based on a parity principle in which each ministry is covered by a corresponding parliamentary committee? If we do not have a state administration, then we cannot start to establish new local self-government units, since first of all the state has to organize itself for that. And if the state is not established, we also cannot pass a number of other laws, since every such state action has to have a counterweight, a body that will implement the law that has been passed. We need new rules of procedure; the State Assembly will not even be able to work without them. For all of the above we are also using a specific concept, so that we will not take a little from Austrian models, and a little from German, Spanish, and other models. Such a concept does not exist, however," Dr. Bucar warned about a subject that is very topical, and also rejected the thesis that the elections themselves will solve many problems.

[Taskar] It seems, however, that it is no longer possible to pass almost anything in parliament.

[Bucar] The present opposition has decided on a blockade. They also announced it on the speaker's platform at the time of the constructive no-confidence vote, saying that they would do everything possible to keep the new government from being formed, because it was a Bolshevik coup, even though it was voted according to the constitution. They are using all possible procedural tricks, and criticizing me for violating the constitution and the rules of procedure.

"These are not the mild consolations of an offended president, but rather a warning that it is necessary to establish the state," Dr. Bucar answered, and continued: "The Christian Democrats' congress had the slogan 'It Matters to Us,' but they are behaving as if it did not matter to them at all if this state collapsed immediately. If they continue to act like that in parliament and prevent the passage of all the urgently needed laws, except for the electoral ones, it will be a tragedy, since we will lose everything that we achieved in two years. It seems that it really does not matter to them."

[Taskar] How would you comment on the proposals that you should be dismissed from your office as president for violating the constitution and the rules of procedure, and for usurping power?

[Bucar] For the time being I have not yet been informed about this, but it is certainly something that is part of the arsenal of destruction. I will certainly still be exposed to criticisms, since on one hand we have a new constitution, and on the other, the system of Assembly operation from the former regime. These two systems are so different that it is necessary to build a bridge constantly. It is necessary to bridge over the big gap through logical interpretation, through the spirit of the new constitution. Every interpretation, however, always allows different feelings, with the justification that it matters to them. The real question, however, is why it matters to them. To be sure, the same thing is happening in the financial area, where the structure has been inherited from the previous system of nonbudgetary operation, but at the same time we have the concept of an integral budget. These are thus systems that exclude each other, and there is a conflict between them; that is why there will still be many difficulties and also contrived accusations about raids on the monetary system.

[Taskar] In your opinion, what will the outcome be with respect to the electoral legislation?

[Bucar] The legislative referendum that the National Democrats are proposing is not possible as long as we do not have a referendum law. This issue will be discussed by the constitutional commission tomorrow. And even if we ignore the fact that there is no law, the main condition for a referendum in accordance with the new constitution is no longer even fulfilled; the 80 signatures on the proposal for it are no longer enough. I have statements in writing about the withdrawal of signatures. In any case, there will be no elections if the electoral laws are not passed. Also, the term of the present parliament will not be extended by an amendment to the constitutional law, since a two-thirds majority is also needed for that. We will get into a situation that is legal suicide. These are not big words; this is such a

big, threatening danger that we do not even have a real idea of it. It is not even possible to straighten out such a situation by legal means.

[Taskar] Then there obviously remains a presidential dictatorship, which several deputies are mentioning.

[Bucar] No, a presidential dictatorship would be unconstitutional. This is the unspeakable danger of such a situation and of the intolerable irresponsibility of the deputies, which can lead to our wasting everything in a very short time.

[Taskar] Would judicious use of the old legislation, as the constitutional law allows, be a solution?

[Bucar] Even judicious use of the old laws shares the same fate; if we were to use it, a two-thirds decision by parliament would again be necessary. The new opposition will certainly not give its consent to a pure proportional system, which we had for the elections to the Sociopolitical Chamber, and there is also no possibility that the new regime would impose it on the opposition. The problem, of course, is not even in the electoral system, but rather in the formation of the Slovene political scene. The basic question is whether the present political fragmentation will be continued. If it will, then a proportional system is necessary. The present party leaders, however, will have to be gradually shown that they also have to look over the fence of party interests and get a somewhat broader view of the formation of parties and political life in Slovenia in general. No progress will be made with things as they are now. This is completely clear. If the defeated parties think that things can go on that way for the sake of the interests of the party leaders, they are mistaken, and they will be seriously disappointed.

[Taskar] You are also being criticized because you will not convene meetings of the presidency of the Assembly, and because it is not possible to agree on anything.

[Bucar] Before every session, we have a meeting with the presidents of the chambers about the course of the sessions. There is no presidency of the Assembly. That is also why I cannot hide behind any supposed collective body. I am aware of my duties, and I take full responsibility for them. And since some people are already citing the rules of procedure so much, they also say that a deputy has the right and duty to work in the sessions. And if you go out onto the balcony and watch what is happening in the hall, when you ought to be participating, that is also a violation of the rules of procedure, but those involved deny any responsibility for this.

Slovene Radio-TV Director Jerovsek Resigns
92BA1133B Ljubljana DNEVNIK in Slovene
20 Jun 92 p 4

[Article by (ri): "Struggle for Dominance at Radio-TV"]

[Text] *Janez Jerovsek, the general director of Slovene RTV [Radio-TV] has resigned. Rehabilitation of Slovene RTV: One-third of the employees are to be surplus.*

Ljubljana, 20 Jun—Instead of the requested explanation of why the directors of RTV's organizational units, headed by the general director, are once again proposing an increase in

RTV subscription fees (by 28.7 percent), instead of thinking about the measures proposed in the rehabilitation program that has just been prepared, RTV's general director, Dr. Janez Jerovsek, offered his resignation at yesterday's meeting of the RTV Council, and cited political reasons as the basic ones for it.

After Dr. Jerovsek's resignation, the question was also raised of whether it is sensible to discuss the rehabilitation program, which was prepared by Vilijem Nemec from the independent firm Cos Consulting, since it is not clear who will carry it out, but in spite of everything positions were expressed later on in the meeting about individual measures for making RTV's operation more efficient, and deadlines for implementation and those formally responsible for the tasks were designated. The rehabilitation program, which was prepared on the basis of a comparative analysis of the operation of RTV firms in five European states, takes into account the reserves inside the firm, and does not provide for a real increase in subscription fees. According to these findings, 30 percent too many people are supposed to be employed at Slovene RTV; wages could be raised only by reducing the number of employees by 10 percent by the end of this year and 20 percent by the end of next year. The RTV Council adopted a resolution that by October, an independent firm, which has to be sought by the leadership of RTV, has to prepare an analysis of the employment structure and possible surpluses. According to one of the rehabilitation proposals, the Maribor and Koper radio stations are to support themselves in time, without subscription fees. The proposal encountered considerable opposition; "We are producing a national program," was the justification. Consequently, one of the Council's decisions was that a special commission should determine what the national program was.

By the fall, the leadership and other services at RTV are to be reorganized, differential payment of the subscription fee is to be considered, etc. The discussion about the rehabilitation program will be continued at the next meeting, at which Dr. Jerovsek is also to be formally dismissed. By the unanimous decision of the RTV Council, the managing editor of the Slovene program on Koper Capodistria TV is Barbara Zigante.

[Box, p 4]

Political Intrigues Are Coming One After Another

"My resignation is a warning and a protest against the revival of undemocratic political forces that held power in the former regime and are trying to occupy all the key positions again, and are not sparing any means to achieve this," Dr. Jerovsek explained his resignation. With the process of the constructive no-confidence vote, he said, the political struggle for RTV had intensified, and because of successive political intrigues, normal work in the position of general director was no longer possible. As examples of political machinations, he listed the following: The U.S. Department of State has reported that 14 journalists at Slovene RTV were dismissed for political reasons; this false information, of course, was obtained in Slovenia, Dr. Jerovsek emphasized. At the time of the past journalists'

strike, "which was political in nature, since it announced a wave of strikes," the SDK [Public Auditing Service] determined that the RTV leadership's statements about the journalists' wages were correct, and after political intervention denied this, thus declaring itself not to be authoritative. The initiative for the recall of several Demos members in the RTV Council coincided with the intensification of the struggle for RTV; in Jerovsek's opinion, the initiators of this recall—the coordinating group of trade unions at RTV—are a political and party alliance of forces from the former regime. Political aims also contributed to the creation of problems over the loan from the Austrian ORF, and all the other lies about it and editor Mito Trefalt. The Liberal

Democrats are the worst and least responsible political force in Slovenia, Dr. Jerovsek said. "We would still be occupied if it were up to them."

Regarding the conflicts resulting from the failure to implement the collective contract, he said that the signing of the journalists' collective contract was coerced, and that consequently it could not be implemented, and the firm's collective contract could not be signed because they would need 30 to 50 percent more funds than they had available for it. Among the reasons for his resignation, he also listed the political obstruction of decisionmaking in the RTV Council.

Albanians Allegedly Discriminated Against
AU0807080892 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
24 Jun 92 p 10

[Article by M. Jaksic: "Cana Calls 'Helsinki Watch' for Help"]

[Text] Zagreb, 23 Jun—In an interview with NEDELJNA DALMACIJA, Zekerija Cana spoke of the violation of the human rights of Albanians in Croatia, and said that he would travel to Vienna to inform "Helsinki Watch." As the latest example of ethnic oppression of Albanians, he mentioned the curtailment of news in Albanian on Croatian radio.

Cana believes that the Croatian authorities are treating Albanians in Croatia unfairly because the Albanians have not opened a southern front. According to Cana, such accusations do not stand up for several reasons—mostly because "in the 1920's an agreement was reached among Croatian, Albanian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian ideologists to undo the Versailles Yugoslavia." Another reason is that there are Albanians fighting in the Croatian Army, but most importantly, because, according to Cana, the Albanians in Kosovo are not really armed, "so if they did rise to arms, Kosovo would be turned into a mass graveyard." Cana added that "there never really was a corridor for arms procurement, since neighboring Albanian had a Bolshevik government, which was not willing to do its moral duty toward its brothers in Kosovo."

Cana said he is concerned about the status of the Albanians in Croatia, because he thinks they are treated as foreigners, noting they can not get "Croatian documents or a passport." He mentioned the fact that Pavelic's Independent State of Croatia had, at the time, sent the Albanian Government a document in which it asked the Albanian authorities to send two teachers to Zagreb so that an Albanian primary school could be opened.

"How can one justify the fact that, in Belgrade, there is a department for Albanian studies within the faculty of humanities, while despite all the efforts we have put into it over the years there is no such thing in Zagreb," Cana said, noticeably irritated. He then added:

"There are many Albanians who have found themselves in Croatia with a Yugoslav passport that has expired, and they cannot go anywhere abroad with it. The Croatian authorities are not issuing them with passports, so they simply have nowhere to go. They are foreigners in Croatia, and yet they cannot leave."

Albanian Leader Nevzat Halili Interviewed
AU1706124192 Pristina ZERI in Albanian
6 Jun 92 pp 16-17

[Interview with Nevzat Halili, chairman of the Party of Democratic Prosperity, by Bardh Hamzaj and Shaip Beqiri; place and date not given: "How To Prevent New Subdivisions"]

[Text] *The position of Macedonia for the time being is a sort of phenomenon in itself: No one contests its international*

status, apart from Greece, but, on the other hand, there are always reasons Macedonia should not join the list of independent states.

Recognition of Macedonia's independence puts forward one of the many unsolved issues in the Balkans. Although it is said directly and openly that Greece alone is making it impossible for Macedonia to be recognized by the European Community, there are many outside factors prolonging this problem. It is not just because we want to say it that the unsolved Albanian issue plays an important role in all of this.

[ZERI] How far have the Albanians in Macedonia succeeded in presenting their problem, making the recognition of Macedonia conditional on the solution of the Albanian issue?

[Halili] During the last visit Veton Surroi and I paid to the Peace Conference in Brussels, Ambassador Ahrens said that next time we could go separately because the Albanian issue in the former Yugoslavia will be treated separately: As an issue of Kosovo and an issue of Albanians in Macedonia. The impression was that in the future, under the supervision of international bodies, the Kosovo cause would be negotiated between the Albanians and the Serbs, while in Macedonia the negotiations would be between the Macedonians and the Albanians. We informed Ahrens that we shall soon initiate changes to the Constitution of Macedonia because of the great discontent of the Albanian population caused by the constitution and because of the stand confirmed at the First Congress of the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PPD].

[ZERI] Can you tell us more concretely what the initiative for the change to the constitution will demand?

[Halili] We will do our best to achieve the goals of political and territorial autonomy established in January's referendum. So the position of Albanians should generally change, at least as far as the autonomy of Albanian-inhabited regions is concerned. This goal includes the demand that Albanians in Macedonia should be recognized as capable of forming a state. Even though I mentioned it in second place, our basic goal is to achieve the status of a state-forming nation. I would say that these demands are natural, and Gligorov has accepted this too. Besides, he said that we are right in these demands, and we shall look for the opportunity for Albanian representatives to join the Macedonian delegations that are in touch with the peace conference. However, I have to say with regret that the verbal statements of the president of Macedonia are not coming true. The new democratic government in Tirana is giving new, positive impetus to our demands and is advancing our cause wherever possible.

[ZERI] As far as we know, there are some ways of taking the initiative to change the constitution. Which of these will be used, and what are the chances of reason prevailing in the parliament of Macedonia, which would lead to a calm judgment of the initiative and prevent Albanian deputies being outvoted again?

[Halili] The initiative to change the constitution can be launched in four ways. The president of the republic, the government of the republic, a group of 30 deputies (which

we do not have) can do it. The last possibility is to gather 150,000 signatures. Our parliamentarians will soon present a written demand to the president of the Republic and will see whether he is ready to start to change the constitution. The peace conference has been informed about this, and I can say that the impression that the Macedonian authorities try to give—that the Albanian factor is unimportant to the international recognition of Macedonia—is not true.

[ZERI] Mr. Halili, so far we have talked about the relevant factors determining the position of Macedonia. There exist other factors too, of direct influence on the future of Macedonia. We are interested in learning your opinion of whether Macedonia is closer to international recognition or closer to its partition.

[Halili] Listen, the issues are very complicated. For the time being, the prevailing international mood is that Macedonia should remain an independent entity with an entirely new position for the Albanians who live there.

When they give us a negative response about changing the constitution, they justify this by claiming it is a complicated matter that requires a long procedure. Meanwhile, they forget the fact that they changed the constitution very quickly and with no problems when they were supposed to grant extra guarantees that Macedonia has no pretensions toward its neighbors. Can Macedonia be split up? These demands could possibly come from Serbia and Bulgaria. Democratic Albania has not mentioned such a thing. Thus, the position of Albanians and of Albania is obvious: They demand no partition, but only equal participation in the republic's statehood. It may be that the plans for the partition of Macedonia have their supporters within Macedonia itself, which could explain the "significant" question of the referendum for a sovereign Macedonia organized here last September. At that time, we also said that Albanians support an independent Macedonia, but the second half of the question—"with the right of union in an eventual community"—seemed suspicious to us. In that situation, we want to have our destiny in our hands.

[ZERI] The occupying Serbian regime has filled Kosovo with military forces and weaponry, so the danger of the so-called southern front has not yet evaporated. What does this mean for the Albanians in Macedonia and for Macedonia as a state?

[Halili] I live in Tetovo, but first of all I am an Albanian. Every conflict in Kosovo includes the entire Albanian world.... Serbia must clearly know that, if it intends to provoke a conflict in Kosovo, Serbia cannot limit it.... The conflict will broaden and will have international dimensions. Sandzak, Macedonia, Greece, Albania, and Bulgaria will automatically be involved; in other words, the Balkans as a whole. The Albanians have always proved that no matter how complicated problems are, they do not favor solution by force, and we therefore do not want such a thing. The present international policy and relations favor this option.

[ZERI] Kosovo has already entered a new stage. The Albanians have held multiparty elections for the Assembly of the Republic and for its president.

[Halili] Just before the elections in Kosovo, the defeat of communism and the victory of the Albanian democracy occurred in the motherland. The Albanian cause won a great deal after 22 March....

The Kosovo elections on 24 May are historic, too, and were multiparty elections, but it was rightly said that they were not free because they were held under the classic conditions of occupation. The Kosovo Albanians have achieved an age-old goal with the successful conclusion of the elections of 24 May for Kosovo to become an independent entity and once and for all to be separated from Serbian tutelage.

Serbia cannot call on a "historical right" to Kosovo anymore, based on untrue medieval mythology. Serbia has finally lost Kosovo, and the sooner it realizes this the better for Serbia. The election of Dr. Ibrahim Rugova as president of the republic shows that he is joining the highest ranks of Albanian personalities.

Statehood, Autonomy, and Ilirida

[ZERI] The Albanian population and their political bodies in Macedonia have put forward the possibility of having state-forming status as their first demand, but the referendum for political and territorial autonomy was held later and was followed by the drafting of documents for the Republic of Ilirida. Is there a consensus about these demands among the political bodies of the Albanians in Macedonia today?

[Halili] The PPD has recognized the sovereignty of Macedonia from the very beginning, but only as a state of equal Macedonians and Albanians. On this point, we demanded to be defined as a state-forming population in the new constitution. Unfortunately, the demands of our deputies in the parliament were shamelessly ignored and outvoted. Therefore, the Albanian deputies did not vote for the new constitution. As the result of this discontent, the idea arose of holding the referendum for political and territorial autonomy. Perhaps we have rushed a little bit, because we could not ponder everything in the best way.... It is true that it took us some time to define some things definitely and precisely, but I think that there is a general consensus for the state-forming status. After all, why shouldn't Macedonia become a federation? This model is not unknown to Europe, and has proved an effective one for many developed countries of Europe. I can say that the federation of Macedonia has its roots in the period before World War I, but they began to change the words after World War II, with the constitution of the Macedonian nation, and therefore we are in this position today. Krste Crvenkovski wrote about this in his letter to the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party in July 1943. He stated that western Macedonia is mainly inhabited by Albanians, who after the war should have the same rights as the Albanians in Kosovo.

[ZERI] Observers of political currents have noted that there once was a "rift" over coordinating work between the PPD and its parliamentary group. Have these "short circuits" been repaired?

[Halili] It is true that the parliamentary group has observed in detail all the demands of our party. There were some

different individual attitudes that did not always agree with the stands of the party, but this is another thing. However, we cannot say that there were differences between the party and the parliamentary group. Everything went well until the approval of the Constitution of Macedonia, when there were some senseless situations and some individual viewpoints that were "different" from the party's; otherwise, I would not say they raised opposition. The parliamentary group said it thought that the referendum should not be held so soon, and maybe they were right because we could not weigh everything in detail. However, time is proving that we did not make a mistake in holding the referendum on 11-12 January; that is before 15 January. We have received positive appreciation of the referendum from international organizations, too.

Disagreement with the parliamentary group has started to fade away. We meet with each other more often. They have grown closer to the party, and apparently we understand their standpoints better. The deputies have persisted in the demand for state-forming status, considering the demand for autonomy to be ill-considered. Various experts say that these two demands do not exclude each other, but complement each other.

[ZERI] There are three parties that now gather Albanians in Macedonia. This has created an atmosphere of pluralism, but one encounters here and there the view that the formation of many parties has fragmented the policy of the Albanians.

[Halili] It is true that the PPD is the biggest party, and at first we had a dilemma over whether we should form some other political parties. However, I do not think we made a mistake in forming the Popular Democratic Party. We have found a common language on all the important national issues. The Albanian Democratic Party, which was founded recently, is a liberal party, and we have been warned that another party will be formed soon, based in Tetovo, and that its nucleus will be the people who are not satisfied with the PPD.

[ZERI] We think this discontent has been noted because of the work of the First Congress of the PPD.

[Halili] You are right, but it is not right when some people lay stress on some articles published in FLAKA E VELLAZ-ERIMIT. Sometimes they go so far as to accuse the PPD of monism and say that we once had Serbian monism and now have Albanian monism. Who are these people who give this right to themselves? They are those whose suggestions were not passed by some party bodies, and who now want to make such accusations. We do not need this kind of "pluralism." It seems to me that we are rather dealing with careerist appetites...but anyway, time will tell. Let these gentlemen who want a European-style party tell me which European party has reached such a level in only two years. This is impossible, and it is not right to expect European results under the conditions of the Balkans.

[ZERI] Is it likely that there will be a campaign against PPD in Macedonia?

[Halili] There was a campaign even before the congress was held. Its creators had planned that it would erupt at the congress, but they did not succeed. The motivations of such a campaign are not very clear to me, but I believe they are not essentially good and that their purpose is very suspicious. I do not want to deny others the possibility of thinking differently, but it seems to me that it is a question of something else.

[ZERI] The last question is: How did you feel about the establishment of the new border at Han i Elezit [Djeneral Jankovic]?

[Halili] This is another part of our misfortune—the subdivision of a divided people. It deeply affected me personally. We have emphasized this fact wherever possible in the presence of foreign delegations, and indeed what is happening is an anti-Albanian policy, a tendency to divide Albanians. We shall do more to help the Albanians to communicate among themselves, wherever they are, like everybody else. If we do not achieve this goal, then nothing will come even from a united Europe, this idea that is being talked about. You still need visas to go to Albania. As long as the Macedonian state enforces this, statements about democracy and the modern European order do not seem very sincere to me.

Issue of Command of Bosnian-Croatian Alliance
92BA1104C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
18 Jun 92 p 5

[Article by M. Jaksic: "Who Will Command the Military Alliance?"]

[Text] Zagreb, 17 Jun—Following the joint announcement of Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, which pertains to various forms of cooperation between the two states, the attention of the public here was especially aroused by that point in which it is possible to suspect mutual military cooperation. This is Point 3, which states the following:

"The Republic of Croatia supports the efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina [B-H] to preserve its independence and combat aggression, and it is furnishing help in that respect and will continue to furnish help to it. The Republic of Croatia is also supporting efforts of the legal authority of the government and Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to consolidate defense of the republic by unifying all forms and components of armed resistance into unified armed forces under the Supreme Command of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, constituted in the spirit of Point 4."

Military Assistance Indisputable

The amount of interest of the public here in possible military cooperation between the two republics is confirmed by the articles in certain newspapers, for example, GLOBUS, in which Slobodan Lang, otherwise declared here to be one of the greatest fighters for human rights, recently came out openly for military assistance, which, according to him, Croatia ought to furnish to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Lang's views of the events in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to be sure, are not Croatia's official view. But many people here are nevertheless put in a quandary by a

sentence in Point 3 of the announcement referred to (the motives behind this interest certainly vary. They range from those who would like that kind of military cooperation to more cautious people who fear international consequences for Croatia on that basis), which states the following:

"The Republic of Croatia supports the efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve its independence and combat aggression, and it is offering aid in this respect and will continue to offer it...." It is not difficult, that is, to recognize in this sentence the correspondence between the "efforts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve its independence and combat aggression" with the rest of the sentence, which states "and it is offering aid in this respect and will continue to offer it...." After all, because the greatest reference here is nevertheless to war efforts or military (i.e., armed) efforts, it is difficult to draw from the last part of the sentence "and it is offering aid in this respect and will continue to offer it...." any other conclusion than that Croatia has already been offering military assistance to Alija's units or the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and also that it will continue to do so.

Assistance in "combating aggression," to be sure, may also be moral or political in character. Except that then the word "support" is usually used to describe these relations.

The question is why the text of the statement did not specifically say in what manner Croatia was helping the neighboring republic "in combating aggression," so that it would probably be easier to resolve the dilemmas arising out of that sentence. After all, the text of the joint statement was probably not written by illiterates.

Who Censored the Statement for Croatian Radio-TV?

VECERNJI LIST of Zagreb, however, opens up yet another interesting dilemma related to the Tudjman-Izetbegovic statement, pointing to the censoring of that statement by Croatian Television: "Croatian Radio-TV omitted from Point 3 that part of the text about united armed forces of B-H. That is, the part of the sentence to the effect that the unified armed forces under command of the Presidency of B-H would be 'constituted in the spirit of Point 4.' It was not published. This, our readers note, destroys the sense and purport of the 'principle of equality of the three constituent nationalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina.' It is difficult to believe that such an essential political purport of the Tudjman-Izetbegovic agreement could have been omitted out of carelessness," VECERNJI LIST said.

The key question, then, related to this criticism by VECERNJI LIST is whether units of the HVO are actually under the unified control of the B-H Presidency or recognize only their own command, fighting, it is certain, together with Bosnia-Herzegovina TO [Territorial Defense]? After all, it follows from the critical remarks of that newspaper that someone at Croatian TV (or Croatian TV did it under someone's influence) deliberately wanted to disavow that part of the Tudjman-Izetbegovic statement that speaks about the Presidency of B-H as the joint command, which actually is completely in accord with certain prior statements of the leaders of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of western Herzegovina to the effect that units

of the HVO are fighting together with the B-H Territorial Defense, but exclusively under their own command.

Such statements were also made by Dobroslav Paraga, president of the HSP [Croatian Rights Party], and his military adviser Mile Dedakovic, so that the conflict between such statements (and also the actual situation at the front when it comes to the question of who is commanding whom) and the sentences of the joint statement by Tudjman and Izetbegovic, including the aforementioned censoring by Croatian Radio-TV, can hardly be eliminated by the differing approaches to the chain of command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina (or, better put, Muslim-Croatian) armed force, from whose contradictions there nevertheless follow those aspirations which we might place under the common denominator of a gradual separation of one body of the territory of B-H from the makeup of that republic as internationally recognized.

Incidentally, the other day the Croatian Defense Council also formed its own professional (Croatian) army when at a promotion for the elite unit of that army which is called the "Bruno Busic" Regiment, Mate Boban, chairman of the Croatian Defense Council and president of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosnia, spoke in terms of the military sovereign of Croatia. At no moment did he mention joint armed forces of B-H.

The Tudjman-Paraga Debate

However, if we are to arrive more easily at the ultimate consequences of all these contradictions in statements, publicly uttered opinions, or practical moves, it is also worth noting certain interesting polemical tones between Franjo Tudjman and Dobroslav Paraga. Franjo Tudjman, presumably under pressure of criticism from international institutions that Croatia has also had its finger in the drama of war in B-H, recently declared in a regular press conference that it is not true that units of the HOS [Croatian Armed Forces] are fighting in Herzegovina, thereby colliding sharply with Jerko Doka, the Bosnia-Herzegovina minister, who had praised those units. Tudjman then declared: "Those are perhaps only certain individuals from the HOS who are fighting there," and then soon afterward this was denied by Dobroslav Paraga, who confirmed in a public statement that his units are in fact in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attributing to them the greatest importance in military operations.

In any case, for three months now, that is, long before war broke out in B-H, Paraga has been listing by name the places where units of the HOS are located in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He said that they cover all of western Herzegovina, that they are in central Bosnia, indeed even in Bijeljina, Zvornik, Visegrad, Han Pijesak, and so on. And Mile Dedakovic has openly spoken about directing their organization, presenting even the plans of operations which were envisaged even then, and also describing certain battles which he had directed. Mile Dedakovic, however, was not born in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but in Slavonia, so that in this specific case the argument of the official Croatian Government is not valid that "those fighting in the neighboring republic are only

those from the Croatian theater who had come to Croatia from that republic as volunteers."

In any case, there was also mention in Paraga's press conference of combat operations of the HOS on the Kupres Plateau and in the town of Kupres itself before the Serbian army established control over that area, and back last year in a telephone conversation with the Croatian Supreme Command Dedakovic criticized that same Supreme Command for having sent 12 trailer trucks of arms to western Hercegovina instead of to Vukovar. The transcript of that conversation has been published by SLOBODNI TJEDNIK, and no one has denied Dedakovic's assertions.

Croatian Foreign Minister Denies Military Pact
92BA1114C Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
20 Jun 92 p 17

[Unattributed TANJUG article: "Dr. Zdenko Skrabalo: A Military Pact Between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina Is Out of the Question"]

[Text] Zagreb, 19 Jun (TANJUG)—Any sort of "military pact" between Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina is out of the question. "That is disinformation," the new Croatian foreign minister, Dr. Zdenko Skrabalo, stated today at his first presentation for journalists in Zagreb.

Croatia, he added, wants close cooperation with Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, has to be established on the basis of an agreement among the three peoples, but in such a way that the Croatian people are guaranteed full rights, Skrabalo specified.

In connection with the latest report from UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali, which mentions that "the Croatian army is participating in Bosnia-Hercegovina," Skrabalo said that "it is part of a campaign and it does not have any basis."

Skrabalo said that 135 people were employed in the Croatian Foreign Ministry, 22 of whom were taken from the foreign Yugoslav diplomatic service.

Arms Produced in Bosnia 'Plundered' by Croatia
92BA1104A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Jun 92 p 11

[Article by D. Kecman: "Plundered Arms Worth \$10 Million"]

[Text] Novi Travnik, 4 Jun—Armament produced in Bratstvo of Novi Travnik last year to meet the needs of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], for which an amount equivalent to \$10 million at that time had been paid, was shipped the other day to the Republic of Croatia and placed at the disposition of the armed forces of that state on the battlefield in B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina]. Finished goods, military equipment, and spare parts worth \$8 million were stolen from the military section of Bratstvo for the armed formations of Croatia and to meet the needs of its national army, and more than \$2 million of the \$10 million mentioned consisted of equipment and spare parts.

The Croatian Armed Forces also took from the military plant of Bratstvo three Orkan rocket launchers (a 12-barrel launcher known as the KOL 15), four Ogan rocket launchers, a battery (six guns) of 152-mm howitzers popularly known as Nora, three 122-mm howitzer batteries, two 105-mm howitzer batteries, 30 82-mm recoilless cannons, 30 23-mm aircraft cannons (double-barrel cannons with a firing capacity of 3,600 rounds per minute, the so-called GSh), 20 125-mm tank cannons, 86 120-mm mortars, 100 each of 80-mm and 60-mm mortars and 44-mm bazookas, and a large quantity of spare parts for these weapons.

Once the plant had been emptied, production began under completely new programs which take one aback in terms of quantities, but also the further intentions and military plans of the aggressors. The capability of the military department of Bratstvo is 1,000 122-mm howitzers and more than 10,000 mortars per year, without putting any kind of load on production capacity.

Production began the other day just as in peacetime. Important materials and parts are arriving from Croatia and Slovenia through Hercegovina, by the Prozor-Gornji Vakuf-Novi Travnik highway route. The Ravne Steel Mill manufactures the rear end of gun carriages and gun barrels longer than six meters, those shorter than six meters are produced in Zenica, and barrels for all types of mortars are manufactured by the steel mill in Sisak. The electronic systems from Cajavec used until recently and assemblies for the fire control systems have been replaced by systems of the same kind and electronics from Iskra in Kranj, where production has developed along two lines simultaneously: both as the principal operation and as a backup.

Sights are being manufactured by Zrak in Sarajevo, and missiles and mortar and artillery ammunition by Pretis in Bogosca. Gunpowder for the main charges is being produced in Vitez, which is under control of the Croatian Army, and with the involvement of certain other subcontractors in Croatia, Slovenia, and Herceg-Bosnia arms production is flourishing in Bratstvo. If we add to this the production program of Slavko Rodic in Bugojno, that is, all types of antitank and antipersonnel mines, hand grenades, and mine and grenade detonators, then it is clear why the Republic of Croatia is encouraging the war in B-H and is sparing no means to include the opstinas of the Lasva region in Herceg-Bosnia and then in Croatia and why it happened that the Croatian Armed Forces attacked the Muslims in Novi Travnik and put the entire military arsenal under their control.

Macedonian Agricultural Organization, Food Supply

92BA1016A Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA
in Macedonian 31 May 92 pp 1, 4

[Article by G. Karevski: "The Pelagonija Agricultural Combine—Pillar of Macedonian Agriculture"]

[Text] *Stable food production ensures the overall stability of a country's economy, which is the reason agriculture deserves*

great concern, President Gligorov said in his address to the managers of Pelagonija, the biggest Macedonian agricultural combine.

Bitola, 30 May—Today, Macedonian Republic President Kiro Gligorov, accompanied by Jovan Andonov, the deputy prime minister, Ivan Shumarov, the minister of agriculture, forests, and water resources, and Dushan Petrov, president of the Macedonian Chamber of Commerce, paid a working visit to Bitola. Gligorov made a special visit to the Pelagonija Agricultural Combine [ZK], where he talked with its managers, after which he visited the Radobor and Kole Kaninski work units, which are part of the combine, in an effort to determine work possibilities and to see personally and directly on site the progress being made in the areas of fall and spring farming.

In his conversations with the guests, Vangel Gagachev, the Pelagonija general director, particularly noted that he is now in charge of one of the largest, if not the largest, farm collective, which farms about 24,000 hectares of land and from which this year, though it is only an average year, is expected to supply Macedonia with at least 30,000 tons of wheat, 15,000 tons of barley, 4,000 tons of sugar beets, and over 10,000 tons of various spring crops.

President Gligorov said that he was pleased to visit one of the pillars of Macedonian agriculture, such as the Pelagonija ZK, and judiciously noted that farming is an age-old Macedonian tradition. It is also the future in which the Macedonian people have always had strong support.

History teaches us that there have been times when we have not taken this properly into account, Gligorov stressed, which has had severe consequences. Conversely, agriculture will remain one of the foundations for overall development in the future, as well, because, looking at it objectively, an agricultural upsurge provides prerequisites for the development of all other aspects of the economy. It is precisely agriculture that is the essential factor in achieving economic stability.

Unfortunately, given the situation in which we find ourselves, we are concentrating essentially on our survival. For that reason, under the conditions in which we are, we are forced to produce even goods we could have imported at much lower prices. Some compromises are truly needed in our production policy in order to meet current needs, above all.

President Gligorov described extensively to the managers of the Pelagonija ZK Macedonia's overall prospects, mentioning the provocations and skepticism concerning Macedonia's basic survival openly engaged in by our neighbors.

We have heard people abroad say that Macedonian is a small country that cannot survive by itself economically and that our agriculture can only rot. This, Gligorov said, might have been the case had we adopted a policy different from the one we chose.

Everything is possible if one works conscientiously. The first thing we must do is avoid the war. In the final account, Gligorov said, the people will realize that no winner can emerge from it. The consequences will be felt by all in terms

of lost lives, destroyed cities, and huge economic damage. We, too, will suffer the consequences, although we cannot be blamed for the war being fought among Yugoslav nations. What is taking place in Sarajevo is a historical disgrace, casting a dark shadow on all Balkan countries, giving all those who had been claiming that the Balkans are Europe's powder keg a reason to say that the Balkans are inhabited by primitive peoples, insufficiently civilized for Europe to accept them in its home. We must behave like Europeans, Gligorov stated, because we are among the oldest nations in Europe and one of the oldest European states. This is also our future. If we display that kind of behavior toward others, we shall be worthy of what is already being said in many places—that there is a small nation, a small country that could set the example for any nation that realizes that force changes nothing.

Serbs See Army Pullout From Region as Betrayal

AU2606173292 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
17 Jun 92 p 8

[Article on interview with Milorad Bojovic, prime minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina, by P. Vucinic and D. Banjac; place and date of interview not given: "Army Has Betrayed Us"]

[Text] Trebinje—"There are no longer any political aims in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina. It is a fight for survival," Milorad Bojovic, prime minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina, said for BORBA. "It is more than obvious that the fate of Hercegovina is decided everywhere but in Hercegovina itself. Almost overnight we have been left to fight alone against the enemy that is three times stronger. Even if we were to mobilize everyone between the age of two and 90, Hercegovina still would not be able to keep that area.

"War has twice been imposed on us. First by Croats, way back during the election campaign, and then the Army confronted them in an inadequate way. The Army promised us a quick victory, and that it would defend the Serbian people. The Army promised to stay in this region for as long as the Serbian people were endangered. The Serbs from this region helped the Army in every way they could, and now the Army has pulled out without achieving the main objective. It has not broken the enemy. The Yugoslav People's Army started this war and has lost it. They have left us with the war," Bojovic said.

Bojovic said that the main political objective in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Hercegovina—the borders on the Neretva River—was achieved when the army held that region.

"When we entered the war we could have taken Neum and reached Metkovic without firing a single bullet. The Neretva River is the best natural border, the dividing line between two worlds. Now we will be at eternal war with the Ustasas. Everyone says that the war will be long. I think it will be a short war, but there will be no peace. There can be no peace without a real and just solution."

In the strategic sense, Bojovic criticized the Army for taking Ston, which is within Croatia's borders, instead of

Neum, which is in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Now we have lost Neum and Ravno, and with the loss of Ravno the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina has lost its Prevlaka [peninsula], since whoever holds Ravno, controls 64 percent of Popovo Polje and is linked to Dubrovnik.

"The Yugoslav People's Army, which has been defeated and humiliated throughout Yugoslavia, is the main culprit for what is now happening to us. Is it being transformed? I would like to see that Army that can be transformed in two weeks. We have served it well, and it has given us nothing in return," Bojovic said, adding that he was only talking about one part of the Army leadership.

Bojovic was not yet ready to name the culprits, because "the influence of the international factor was not yet clear." He was not ready to "condemn Serbia hastily." ("Serbia is also under terrific pressure. I believe its intentions were good, but not its approach to the solution of the problem.") Therefore, he did not see the established borders between the Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a tragedy, because "these are not borders between the people." He said that all Serbs were in a difficult situation.

Because of that, the prime minister of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Herzegovina does not think that political changes in Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will have much of an effect on the conditions among Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Krajinas.

Trifunovic, Varazdin Corps Officers Acquitted
92BA1105D Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
18 Jun 92 p 10

[Article by R. Pavlovic: "General Trifunovic Acquitted"]

[Text] A panel chaired by Colonel Milos Saljic of the Military Court in Belgrade yesterday acquitted three officers of the Varazdin Corps accused of the crime of undermining military and defensive power, that is, turning over large quantities of modern armament and military equipment.

Following a trial lasting almost two months, the court found that Major General Vladimir Trifunovic, commander of the Varazdin Corps, Col. Sreten Raduski, chief of staff, and Col. Berislav Popov, commander of the 32d Mechanized Brigade, did not surrender the Varazdin Corps.

At the same time, the court found two lieutenant colonels of that corps guilty—Vladimir Davidovic and Milos Lukic. The former commander of the "Jakovac Victims" Garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Davidovic, was sentenced to one year in prison, but the five months spent in custody before the trial are to be counted against the sentence.

Lt. Col. Lukic, the officer responsible for defense of the "Ivanica" Army Communications Center near Varazdin, was given a suspended sentence of four months in prison. If Lukic does not break the law for one year, he will not be sent behind bars.

Statement on Croatian TV

The defendant Davidovic was found guilty of the crime of detracting from combat morale and the combat situation.

That is, after the surrender on 20 September of last year, he made a statement to Croatian Television and Radio Varazdin that he had surrendered personnel and weapons because it is "senseless and impossible to wage battle against an armed population and that in defense he did not want to use all the weapons available to him."

It was the judgment of the court that Lt. Col. Davidovic was not compelled to make such a statement; no one had physically mistreated him.

Judge Saljic said that Lt. Col. Milos Lukic had been prohibited from conducting any talks or negotiations whatsoever with the Crisis Command Center of Varazdin Opstina, but he nevertheless received in the garrison two men from the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and talked to them about the surrender. This, in the estimation of the court, contributed to the large-scale flight of soldiers from the garrison.

Stating the reasons for the verdict, Judge Saljic mentioned that Lt. Col. Lukic had spent several months on the battlefield, where he had achieved excellent results, and this was taken as an alleviating circumstance.

Why were Trifunovic, Raduski, and Popov acquitted?

"The Varazdin Corps had been put in a hopeless situation," explained Judge Saljic, and he continued, "by implementation of the 'Unity 3' Plan the units were cut in half so that there was not the personnel even to move 15 percent of the equipment. Then came the large-scale flight of the soldiers and officers of Croatian, Slovenian, and Albanian nationalities, and the units were left with only a third of their men."

Officers even abandoned important positions, especially security officers. Col. Popov's unit was deserted by more than 100 officers, more than two-thirds of them. The others stayed to grumble, to detract from morale, and they sent important information to the enemy.

In that kind of situation, help was requested from superior commands, but only promises were forthcoming. Instead of replenishment, in moments most critical for the corps an order came down to release the best-trained age group of soldiers. This was a serious blow to the corps.

The court judged that Trifunovic, Raduski, and Popov did not commit the crime with which they were charged, but had acted in the context of extreme need. Of the two choices—sacrificing people in combat to the last bullet or an agreement on withdrawal—they decided on the latter.

Spare Parts From Hungary

There remained the issue of whether the accused had sufficiently destroyed the armament, because the Croatian paramilitary formations were left 74 T-55 tanks, five tow tanks, two bridge-lane tanks, 61 M-80 VBP armored personnel carriers, seven self-propelled howitzers, six antitank guns, 12 self-propelled... And there were also other weapons used somewhat later in battles against units of the YPA [Yugoslav People's Army].

The court feels that most of the equipment was partially damaged. However, the Croatian forces obtained spare

parts from Hungary and East Germany for the incapacitated weapons and sent the armament to the front.

Lt. Col. Lukic, who was convicted, objected, saying that he did not negotiate with the Crisis Command Center, but this was done by other officers. He also feels that it is illogical to convict only junior officers because of negotiations, while the colonels and generals did the negotiating, but "withdrew."

We were unable to learn whether Col. Momir Koprivica, military prosecutor, would file an appeal against the verdict, because he left the courtroom disgusted immediately after the pronouncement.

[Box, p 10]

Why They Sent Me to Prison

"I expected an acquittal the whole time. I believed in justice, although at the beginning it was displaced. I had some agony because of being held in custody during the investigation, and I also was lynched in the press because of false statements made by those who in fact put me in prison," General Trifunovic declared immediately after the verdict was announced.

Trifunovic then added that in the courtroom he was fighting for his very life, while in Varazdin he was fighting for the lives of men and officers.

Where from here?

"I am among the youngest Serbian generals. Those who put me in prison forced me into retirement, thinking I was guilty. It is difficult at this point to judge why they sent me to prison," Gen. Trifunovic said in conclusion.

Authorities Seen as Undermining University Protest

AU0707142992 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
25 Jun 92 p 7

[Article by O. Nikolic: "Minister's Subtle Methods"]

[Text] "The students' protest '92" is in its 10th day. During this time, the authorities have been increasing pressure on all those in support of the academic revolt, particularly the rectors' collegium of the Belgrade University, the rector himself, and the members of the teaching and science council. We asked how certain deans coped with accusations and threats from the "highest instance."

Dr. Ivan Stajnberger, dean of the faculty of humanities, openly admitted that the pressure on the university was "occasionally both severe and intimidating, probably because the current authorities have neither the strength, the power, nor the ability to solve the problem in any other way."

"Such behavior of the authorities can be interpreted as the reaction of those who know that the ground is slipping away from under their feet. It is the behavior of authorities that are losing control. I see the behavior of Dr. Jovan Strikovic, psychiatrist and representative, in the context of the persecution of certain people. His performance at the rostrum of

the Serbian Assembly, when he attacked the rector of the Belgrade University, is inappropriate to say the least. To qualify somebody as a man who 'thinks one thing, does another, and says something else,' without knowing the man in question (Rector Dr. Rajko Vracar) is extremely tactless, and represents a violation of human and psychiatric ethics," Dr. Stajnberger said.

Dr. Milan Bozic, dean of the faculty of science and mathematics, believes that, after the pressure exerted by the president of the Republic and the prime minister of Serbia, the authorities have now adopted more subtle methods, since the arrogant behavior of the authorities only served to unite the university.

"These subtle methods have opened some procedural legal problems, which will, if not cause divisions, then at least create confusion. In that respect, we have to give credit to the minister of education for being, unlike his employers, the first cunning and skillful Serbian politician. If one has a close look at the objections the ministry has presented to the university, one will notice that the minister has placed emphasis on details that are irrelevant to the political essence of the views of the student and the university. However, these details create confusion. For example, the university has no authority to postpone examinations—that is, in the authority of the teaching and science councils of the faculties. So when that faculty level is reached, it is much easier for the minister to break individual faculties, since some, who have not supported the protest anyway, will agree to hold the examinations. Others will use delay tactics but will eventually yield, and the rest, the most radical ones, will continue the protest, and then the minister of education will say to them: 'Gentlemen, if you are on strike, then you do not get your salaries.' I would like the university to remain united around the statement it issued on 19 June and to see it as a significant force in the process of establishing democracy in Serbia, but I fear it will not be easy," Dr. Milan Bozic said.

Dr. Oliver Antic, acting dean of the law school, also thinks that "the attacks on the rector and the student prorector [student representative in the university committee] that were heard in the Serbian Assembly were horrible."

"That is the continuation of the attack on the whole university, since the rector and student prorector represent the whole academic institution. The majority of the teaching and science council of the law school indignantly reject this attack," Dr. Antic said.

Biographic Data on Presidential Adviser Stojanovic

92BA1105F Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian
18 Jun 92 p 6

[Article by M. Lucic: "The President's Adviser"]

[Text] Dr. Svetozar Stojanovic, professor, special adviser to Dobrica Cosic, president of FR [Federal Republic] Yugoslavia, is an extremely prestigious and esteemed figure in domestic and foreign philosophical and scientific circles.

Born in 1931 in Kragujevac, he became an assistant professor in the School of Philosophy of Belgrade University in 1957, an associate professor in 1962, and later a professor in the philosophy group of the School of Philosophy at Belgrade University, from which, with another seven assistant professors and full professors, he was expelled in 1975 because the conclusion was reached that "such people cannot teach our children at universities and in schools." After six years of "waiting for assignment," he found a job in the Social Sciences Institute in Belgrade, that is, in its Center for Philosophy and Social Theory. Prof. Svetozar Stojanovic has been remembered among generations of students of the School of Philosophy as an exceptional lecturer, a penetrating thinker, and a figure of high moral and intellectual integrity.

He is the author of a number of notable books, many of which have been translated into foreign languages. They are as follows: *Savremena metaetika (Modern Metaethics)*, *Izmedju ideala i stvarnosti (Between the Ideal and Reality)*, *Istorija i partijska svest (History and the Consciousness of the Party)*, *Od etatizma do marksizma sa ljudskim licem (From Statism to Marxism With a Human Face)*, and *Postmarksizam i jugokomunizam (Post-Marxism and Yugocommunism)* is being prepared for publication. His books are based on a radical antidogmatic position for which he has become well known in the world. He was one of the founders of the journal PRAKSIS (PRAXIS) and later editor of its international edition. He has taught at the well-known Free University in Berlin and in recent years has constantly been a visiting professor at American universities. He is a member of many prestigious international societies and academies.

Since the end of the eighties, he has been one of the permanent associates of our newspaper, especially the Saturday cultural supplement, in whose pages he has raised certain current topics and problems important to us.

It just so happens that Professor Stojanovic's first contribution to the pages of our newspaper after he returned to public life was an article entitled "On the Novels of Dobrica Cosic and Arthur Koestler."

Republic Experiences Increased Foreign Debt
AU3006102692 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
17 Jun 92 p 17

[Article by B. Jager: "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Burdened With Debts"]

[Text] The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] will be a highly indebted country, which will have grave problems even without the economic blockade to cover its foreign currency debts with approximately 15 percent of the production it normally sells on the foreign market. According to Dr. Mladen Kovacevic, at the end of last year Serbia's capital foreign debt amounted to \$4.77 billion, \$1.9 billion in interest. Montenegro's capital debt including \$578 million, with \$200 million in interest. During this economically difficult year, Serbia's debt has increased by about \$600 million, according to some estimates.

Approximately at the end of last year, the debt of the former federal state was \$4.4 billion, of which \$3.2 billion was the

capital and \$1.2 billion was the interest. This amount has been slightly reduced this year because of the deferred payment to international financial organizations.

There is no agreement yet on the division of the debt inherited from the former federation. If the participation of the former republics in the gross national product of Yugoslavia is taken into account in the division, Serbia will, according to Kovacevic, have a debt of \$1.2 billion, \$1.7 billion in interest. However, there is another option with which is connected with the question of secession and the inheritance of the FRY, which could result in the majority of federal debts being handed over to the new Yugoslav state. It is obvious that Slovenia and Croatia, and other republics, will do all they can to make it so. The talk of war damages and the desire for the division of the existing foreign currency reserves are proof enough.

Depending on the fate of the federal debt, Serbia's total debt would vary between \$8.5 and \$12 billion, which would result in every citizen owing \$1,000 or more to foreign creditors. That would place Serbia and the FRY in the category of extremely indebted countries, and the question is whether the debt could be paid even under normal circumstances without the current economic blockade. Last year the correlation between the foreign currency inflow of \$3.5 billion and the debts to foreign creditors of \$1 billion was critical.

Under the blockade the foreign currency inflow will be decimated, and, taking into account that this year's gross national product will probably be reduced by another 20-30 percent, it could even happen that in 1992 the gross national product will be smaller than the foreign debt.

Data on Losses of Yugoslav Air Transport
92BA1126D Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
12 Jun 92 p 12

[Article by T. Dzadzic: "Yugoslav Airline Grounded"]

[Text] Of JAT's [Yugoslav Airline] fleet of 32 planes, only one, a Boeing 727, is maintaining the firm's entire air traffic. Instead of flights throughout Europe, Canada, the United States, Africa, the Near and Far East, and Australia, because of Yugoslavia's complete blockade, everything has been reduced to two flights a day: from Belgrade to Podgorica and Tivat. And back. The first direct consequences of JAT's blockade: loss of this firm's total revenues of about \$1 million a day, and the paid leave for an indefinite period of 80 percent of its 7,200 employees.

They even returned two aircraft employed by JAT's joint firms in London, and a planned third never took off.

It is no consolation that JAT planned for this year only 15 planes for the Euro-Mediterranean traffic and three for intercontinental traffic.

"According to that plan, JAT had 12 planes left over for medium-length traffic, and the foreigners had bought that part of the fleet even earlier," Milutin Prsic, director of the JAT center for public relations and advertising, told NIN. "Right now, we are attempting to return before the deadline to one English and one American firm (the deadline is six

months) two of their large DC-10 planes we had leased, which are costing us more than \$400,000 per month. We hope that our foreign trading partners will show understanding, because we have nothing with which to pay these obligations because of the blockade which their countries have instituted."

The transition is being made from the profit philosophy to the survival philosophy. The plan for this year has been abandoned, and a new one is being drafted for the new circumstances.

"The enterprise has to be in a mobile mode, so that if there is a sudden removal of the blockade, our planes can take off on regular routes in an hour. That is why all the pilots will be flying here or abroad so as to preserve their pilot licenses," Prsic says.

Misa Samardzic, director of the JAT technical crew, says that quite a few employees will stay on the job.

"We are negotiating with several large firms in Serbia," Director Samardzic says. "Both the Bor Copper Combine and the thermal electric power plants, for example, have expensive equipment and they are having trouble getting parts; and JAT has up-to-date equipment for repairing parts."

JAT's food factory—the catering service, with a capacity of about 10,000 meals of airplane food a day—was on the average working at one-third capacity even before. Perhaps they will now appear on the streets of Belgrade with certain products, but they lack two vehicles to carry the food, which would cost 20,000-30,000 marks.

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